

Institute for the Study of the USSR

IN THIS ISSUE

Zhukov in India

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Bulgaria—A Cornerstone of the Soviet System

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Current Sino-Soviet Relations

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The Caspian Sea Problem

and

Other Topics from the Current Soviet Scene

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Herausgeber und Verlag Institut zur Erforschung der UdSSR, e. V., München 22, Mannhardtstrasse 6,
Telefon 206 81-84 — Printed in Germany by Buchdruckerei Carl Gerber, München 5, Angertorstrasse 2

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April 1957

ARTICLES

Zhukov in India

N. GALAY

Of the Soviet diplomatic and political steps taken after the events in the Near East, Poland, and Hungary, the prolonged visit paid by Soviet Minister of Defense and Candidate Member of the Presidium of the Party Central Committee Marshal Zhukov to India and Burma was given some of the least attention in the non-Communist world. A detailed study of Zhukov's itinerary and his speeches in India indicate that this trip was more significant than all recent Soviet foreign policy moves elsewhere.

The official Soviet and Indian accounts referred to this visit as a "peace mission" intended to strengthen the bond of friendship between the two great peace-loving nations. Close relations between the two countries were established by Nehru's visit to the USSR and the return visit paid by Bulganin and Khrushchev in 1955.¹ On his arrival in Delhi on January 24, Zhukov expressed his pleasure at "being able to become acquainted with the great Indian culture, the Indian people and their achievements in economic and cultural development."² Indian Ambassador to the USSR K. P. S. Menon gave a more precise reason for Zhukov's visit in a speech televised in Moscow. He remarked that, together with the increasing cooperation between the two great countries, "which had been unanimous in almost all the most important questions of international policy, Zhukov's visit will leave a lasting impression, particularly on our armed forces."³

This clearly underlines the military significance of Zhukov's visit. Although he made passing visits to Indian historical and cultural monuments and indulged in such diversions as riding an elephant, the main purpose was an inspection

¹ *Izvestia*, January 25, 1957.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, January 26, 1957.

of the Indian armed forces and military establishments. This inspection lasted two weeks (January 24—February 10) and was carried out with great thoroughness. Few governments have been as ready to show their military establishments to their closest ally as India did to Marshal Zhukov, who was accompanied by military experts from all branches of the Soviet armed forces: Colonel General N. O. Pavlovsky (a member of the chief inspectorate for the combat training of Soviet troops), Vice-Admiral Eliseev, Lieutenant General of the Air Force Dagaev, and Lieutenant General Kitaev (an engineering specialist). Zhukov visited all the main military training centers and establishments, naval and air bases, centers of the armaments industry, was present at field and staff exercises, and had talks and read reports at military schools and officers' messes.

The business calls paid by the Soviet military delegation reveal the emphasis on inspections:

January 24. Delhi: Arrival of the Soviet military delegation and official reception by the Indian chiefs of staff.

January 26. Delhi: Presence at a parade in honor of the seventh anniversary of Indian independence.

January 27. Delhi: Presence at a meeting of military sports organizations and a model airplane competition.

January 28. Dehra Dun: Inspection of a military college and the 58th Gurkha Training Center.

January 29. Sakaranpur: Inspection of a trial firing range near the Himalayas used for the training of mountain troops, a riding school and a military stud farm.

January 30. Poona: Inspection of the National Academy of Defense at the garrison town of Khadakvasla, 22 kilometers from Poona.

January 31. Bombay: Inspection of a naval base and reception by the head of an air force training center.

February 2. Bangalore: Inspection of an air force engineering college. Cochin: Inspection of a naval base and the Venduruti training center.

February 4. Wellington: Inspection of a military staff college.

February 5. Madras: Reception by the garrison of the city.

February 6. Madras: Inspection of a state railroad factory.

February 7. Vishakhapatnam: Inspection of a shipbuilding center. Calcutta: Inspection of India's first machine-tool plant.

February 8. Agra: Presence at a parade of transport units of the Indian Air Force and a paratroop display.

February 10. Delhi: Reception by the Indian chiefs of staff.⁴

Important points are the minimum number of parades, few visits to the Indian military units being organized, and the stress on the inspection of military

⁴ *Ibid.*, January 25 to February 11, 1957; *Krasnaya zvezda*, January 25 to February 12, 1957.

training establishments. Any consideration of the present evolution of the Indian army will quickly reveal why. Information on the state of the Indian army during the initial period of Indian independence (1949—51)⁵ and the data given in the government handbook *India 1955* give a clear picture of this evolution.

India, with a population of more than 350 million, had the following number of permanent armed forces in 1950—51: 300,000 regular troops for all arms; 130,000 territorial troops; 167,000 National Cadet Corps reserves (organizations of military sports societies). The Indian armed forces were set up as follows: Army: 6 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, several airborne and tank brigades; Air Force: 13 air squadrons (about 220 airplanes); Navy: 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, several escort ships, a limited number of submarines and other types of ships.⁶

The old recruiting system was maintained after the proclamation of Indian independence. Officers were trained in Indian military schools; organization and combat training were based on the British model and until 1953—54 were supervised by British military instructors attached to the Indian army. Air force and naval officers were trained in British military schools. Arms and military equipment were purchased from England and the United States.⁷

The development of the Indian armed forces after the declaration of independence aimed at eliminating dependence on England while attempting to create a modern army with the latest equipment and a command staff trained for present-day warfare.

A number of reorganizational measures were taken. During the build-up of a national army English officers were replaced by Indians, although there are still a limited number of English officers as advisers. The Hindi language and Indian military terminology were introduced. An independent Indian organization for the study of military science was created (there had not been one before). It included military research establishments, naval and air force military technical schools, military academies and colleges, and a staff college. An independent armaments industry was set up.

The difficulties with which the Indian government had to cope are obvious, but significant successes were achieved. The armed forces are now able to train their command personnel without foreign aid. This is a result of an extensive development of training centers, military schools, and colleges, and the combat training of the youth in para-military organizations (the National Cadet Corps) to an extent far beyond the needs of the numerically small Indian armed forces, which are only slightly larger than the Bulgarian and Czech armies. This development points to forthcoming attempts to strengthen the Indian army.

However, a number of weak points, such as a shortage of regular Indian troops familiar with the most modern equipment and higher command personnel

⁵ *Bolskaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (The Large Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, 2nd ed., 1953, XVIII, 75—76.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

familiar with contemporary military science, plus a lack of modern equipment in the army and its training centers, have retarded the development of the Indian armed forces.⁸

If we take into consideration the dominating role played by British military doctrines, which were an automatic inheritance from the country which built up the Indian armed forces, and the Indian desire for complete emancipation, then the invitation to a Soviet expert by neutralist India becomes clear. The invitation to Marshal Zhukov was made on the initiative of the head of the National Defense Academy, General Habibulli, during the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to India in November 1955.⁹ This in itself is evidence of the desire of the Indian armed forces to emancipate themselves from the West.

Zhukov's method of inspection of Indian military training centers, the nature of his report at the staff college in Wellington, and discussions with high-ranking Indian officers indicate that he was given the task of aiding the development of the Indian armed forces as much as possible. Further, examples from Soviet specialist press reports confirm this.

On January 24, Zhukov and the other Soviet officers had a meeting with the chiefs of staff of all three branches of the Indian armed forces in the presence of all the heads of departments of their staffs at the Indian ministry of defense. During the talks a number of problems were touched upon, including the development of engineering units and the role of armored units in modern warfare. Colonel General Pavlovsky conferred with Indian experts on the methods of troop combat training used in the Soviet army. Lieutenant General Dagaev conferred with Indian air force representatives.¹⁰

On February 4, Marshal Zhukov made an extensive report at the staff college in Wellington, which specializes in finishing courses for command personnel and staff officers. Besides giving a historical review of the Soviet army and World War II on the Western front, Zhukov mentioned a number of basic contemporary military problems: the nature and forms of a future war, the role of thermonuclear weapons and their influence on strategy and tactics; the role of ground forces, the navy, and air force with the use of atomic weapons; the possibility of an imaginative solution to problems of army organization and conduct of combat operations.¹¹

Zhukov's visit to military schools, colleges, and training centers resulted in criticism of training methods used by the Indian army. Criticism covered the role of engineering units in defensive operations,¹² infantry in close combat, the use of British rules and methods in training, cavalry training and the use of pack animals for supply purposes in mountainous areas (out of date and superseded by

⁸ *India: A Reference Annual*, Delhi, 1955, pp. 93—105.

⁹ *Krasnaya zvezda*, March 19, 1957.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, March 15, 1957.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, March 23, 1957.

¹² *Ibid.*, March 19, 1957.

helicopters),¹³ and the simplification of some staff studies.¹⁴ Together with this, a number of Indian training methods, such as physical training, the training of mountain troops, and political indoctrination of troops, were approved by Zhukov. Judging by the comments of Soviet press correspondents describing the Soviet delegation's trip, these methods will be used in the Soviet army.

Zhukov also made some statements of a political nature during his trip. Besides propounding general propaganda theses of "peace," "coexistence," "friendship," and giving reminders of the century-old capitalist exploitation of the people of India, he sharply criticized Eisenhower's Near East doctrine and dissociated himself from any friendship with Eisenhower by saying, "Whether Eisenhower has remained the person whom I knew as a soldier—I do not know."¹⁵ Constant reference to the "famed qualities of the Indian soldier . . . the best in the whole British army,"¹⁶ ironic remarks about the English and Americans, who were accused of supplying the Indian army with obsolete weapons and equipment, reference to the Soviet government's willingness to continue its support for the struggle of the peoples of the Near and Far East for their emancipation, and expression of gratitude to the Indian people for their support in this struggle comprised the political content of the Soviet marshal's statements.

Such statements by the Soviet defense minister and representative of the Presidium of the Party Central Committee reveal the political tasks of his visit. He was given the task of extending the Soviet policy of driving a wedge between the Asian peoples and the West, a continuation of the activity of Bulganin and Khrushchev in India in 1955. The immediate aim of Zhukov's visit was to establish contact with and to influence the Indian army, to drive out any remnants of British political influence from the Indian armed forces, to create an atmosphere of distrust towards the United States, and to demonstrate Soviet ability and willingness to aid India.

The establishment of Soviet influence over the Indian armed forces is particularly significant for the Soviet leaders for two reasons. On the one hand, the Indian army plays an important social role in the country; on the other hand, it is acquiring growing significance as an international United Nations police force in the solution of a number of localized conflicts, such as in Korea, Indo-China and at present in the Near East. The Indian army fulfills a number of social welfare functions for the Indian population. Thus, it plays an important role in maintaining health services because there is not yet a sufficiently extensive system of medical services. The army medical services help in the campaign against epidemics, give free treatment to families of members of the forces, and help to set up prophylactic and medical points for the civilian population. Additional work such as crop cultivation by the army are intended to aid the population in case of need.¹⁷ The establishment of Soviet influence over the Indian army thus opens

¹³ *Ibid.*, March 17, 1957.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, March 24, 1957.

¹⁵ *Munchner Merkur*, Munich, February 11, 1957.

¹⁶ *Krasnaya zvezda*, March 17, 1957.

¹⁷ *India: A Reference Annual*, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

up possibilities of influencing the civil population as well. It is quite clear that the pro-Soviet attitude of the Indian armed forces is going to adversely affect their ability to act as neutrals in cases where Indian is called upon to assist the UN by furnishing troops for international police forces.

Soviet influence in India through the Indian forces may be extended further by the army's attitude towards the Soviet army and in particular towards Marshal Zhukov. The speeches of welcome made by the Indian military heads and quoted by the Soviet press were extremely restrained from the political point of view, but characterized by praise for the Soviet army and its representative, Zhukov, to a much greater extent than demanded by eastern courtesy.¹⁸ If the excessive praise bestowed on Marshal Zhukov is the result of a possible misconception of the leaders of the Indian army that they met first of all a representative of a neighboring friendly *government* in the person of Zhukov without appreciating his role as a member of the Presidium of the *Party*—also a widespread conception in the West—then the possibility of Communist influence in India is increased further.

Parallel to this, a number of measures intended to increase influence on India have already been taken in the USSR. On April 2, 1957 the Soviet press reported that from the second half of the current school-year the teaching of the Hindi language was to be introduced alongside Chinese and Arabic in a number of Uzbek secondary schools in Tashkent.¹⁹

The Indian government's desire to strengthen its armed forces, which could be considered a positive step from the point of view of the free world as resistance to Communist aggression, exposes it to the danger of the Indian army falling a victim to Communist infiltration and technical dependence on the USSR. The neutralist tendencies of the Indian government make it extremely vulnerable to the peace offerings of Soviet representatives. Evidence of this danger is the fact that during the recent elections to the Indian parliament, the Indian Communist Party gained an absolute majority in one of the Indian states—Kerala—with a population of more than 13 million, and the number of Communist votes throughout India was doubled in comparison with the previous elections—from 6 to 12 million.²⁰

Finally, one further point has facilitated the Soviet leaders' policy in India. Elsewhere, the influence of a higher standard of living, and the superiority of Western techniques and civilization over Soviet, as experience shows, have a demoralizing influence on Soviet citizens. Such an influence does not exist in India and the industrially underdeveloped Asian countries. The Kremlin's selection of personnel for carrying out pro-Soviet activities in these countries is made easier by this fact. The statements and conduct of the Soviet delegation in India reveal that it was aware of this. Thus, while trying the food during a visit to a naval base, Zhukov remarked on the inadequate rations of the Indian sailors. On being told that a sailor's daily ration was 1,500—1,700 calories (2,200 on

¹⁸ *Izvestia*, January 26, 1957.

¹⁹ *Radio Moscow*, April 2, 1957.

²⁰ *Pravda*, April 6, 1957.

holidays), he replied that a Soviet sailor's ration amounted to 3,750 calories.²¹ In visits to Indian workers' dwellings the Soviet delegation found that living space, often without any furniture, was about 20 square meters for two families of six people. Soviet reporters regarded the large number of beggars, the poverty of the population, and the dreadful sanitary conditions as a "legacy of the colonial system."²² In such conditions Soviet experts in India and the other Asian countries will consider themselves "bearers of culture," sent to help underdeveloped countries.

Marshal Zhukov's trip is an important stage in the extension of Communist influence among the neutral Asian countries. The earlier visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev in November 1955 has been called a "Soviet breakthrough in Southern Asia;"²³ Zhukov's trip may also be regarded as a consolidation and extension of this breakthrough.

Together with the long-range aim of communizing India, the Soviet policy of helping to create a powerful Indian army is pursuing an important immediate task: the creation of a powerful counterweight, in the form of India in the rear of the right flank of the Bagdad Pact, directed against Pakistan, a member of the defensive system of the non-Communist world against Soviet aggression. The political, religious, and national conflicts between these two large states of the Indian subcontinent are being exploited by the Soviet leaders. They are attempting to exert pressure through India on Pakistan with the aim of separating the latter from the non-Communist world.

For the Soviet realistic politicians who take Lenin's formula that revolution and war are the "midwife of history," political pressure on Pakistan requires the strengthening of the Indian armed forces. Pressure on Pakistan is one of the elements in the Soviet campaign against the non-Communist world's defensive organizations—NATO and SEATO, a campaign whose significance has recently been demonstrated by Soviet notes threatening the nations of Western Europe which have American military bases on their territories.

²¹ *Krasnaya zvezda*, March 21, 1957.

²² *Ibid.*, March 24, 1957

²³ *Bulletin*, Munich, No. 3 (1957), pp. 12—19.

Soviet Waterpower Development in the Postwar Economy

ALEXANDER DIBERT

PART II

A number of large hydroelectric projects had been completed prior to World War II. The following is a list of some of them:

| Hydroelectric Station | Location | River | Installed Capacity (Thousand Kilowatts) | Annual Output (Million Kilowatt-Hours) | Initial Year of Operation |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------|---|--|---------------------------|
| Dnepr..... | Zaporozhe (Ukraine) .. | Dnepr . . . | 560 | 3,000 | 1932 |
| Niva II | Panozero (Karelia) ... | Niva | 62 | 340 | 1934 |
| Lower Svir | Lodeinoe pole (Leningrad Oblast) | Svir | 96 | 540 | 1934 |
| Kanaker... .. | Kanaker (Armenia) | Razdan .. | 88 | 400 | 1936 |
| Chirchik | Near Tashkent (Uzbekistan) .. | Chirchik .. | 170 | 830 | 1937 |
| Ivankovo | Ivankovo (Moscow Oblast) | Volga . . . | 30 | 100 | 1937 |
| Khrami I | Barmaksyz (Georgia) | Khrami | 90 | 226 | 1938 |
| Shcherbakov ... | Shcherbakov (Ivanovo Oblast) .. | Volga . . . | 200 | 700 | 1941 |
| Uglich | Uglich (Yaroslavl Oblast) | Volga | 120 | 330 | 1941 |
| Upper Svir..... | Svir Station (Leningrad Oblast) . | Svir | 144 | 623 | 1941 |

SOURCE: Benjamin I. Weitz, ed., *Electric Power Development in the USSR*, Moscow, 1936, pp. 272, 273

Some hydroelectric plants were built during the war. In the Uzbek SSR, four stations were completed and ten more were under construction during the war period. The largest was the Farkhad station, which was to have a capacity of 66,000 kilowatts.¹

All the stations that had been destroyed were rebuilt after the war. The most important postwar projects, including those not yet completed, are shown in the table on the following page.

The Soviets claim that on completion the Kuibyshev and Stalingrad stations will be the largest hydroelectric installations in the world. The planned distribution of power from these two plants, together with that from the Kakhovka plant, is something of an innovation. A portion of the power is intended for agriculture and irrigation. The following table gives the projected distribution (in billion kilowatt-hours):

| | Average Annual Output | Irrigation Purposes | Transmission to Moscow | Local Usage | Central (Kuznetsov) Belt |
|------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|-------------|--------------------------|
| Kuibyshev | 10.0 | 1.5 | 6.1 | 2.4 | — |
| Stalingrad | 10.0 | 2.0 | 4.0 | 2.8 | 1.2 |
| Kakhovka | 1.2 | 0.6 | — | 0.6 | — |

SOURCE: *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (The Large Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, 2nd ed., 1950, VII, 221

¹ Theodore Shabad, *Geography of the USSR*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1951, p. 396

Fifty six percent of the planned power from the Stalingrad and Kuibyshev stations is to be transmitted to other regions. This requires the erection of high-capacity transmission lines, including one 925 kilometers long from the Kuibyshev plant to Moscow and one 1,060 kilometers long from the Stalingrad plant to Moscow.²

Fifty percent of the total output of the Tsimlyansky plant is utilized for irrigation purposes. This provides water for irrigating 750,000 hectares of land, and lesser amounts of water for cattle raising and limited agriculture over 2,000,000 hectares.³

Principal Soviet Postwar Hydroelectric Projects

| Station | River | Installed Capacity (Thousand Kilowatts) | Initial Year of Operation |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|--|----------------------------|
| Kuibyshev | Volga | 2,100 | 1955 |
| Stalingrad | Volga | 1,700 | 1956 |
| Kakhovka | Dnepr | 250 | 1955 |
| Tsimlyansky | Don | 160 | 1952 |
| Gorky | Volga | 400—500 | Under Construction |
| Nizhnekamskaya | Kama | 900 | Construction not yet Begun |
| Ust-Kamenogorsk | Irtys | 1,000 | 1953 |
| Bukhtarma | Irtys | * | Under Construction |
| Votkinsk | Kama | 540 | Under Construction |
| Mingechaur | Kura | 357 | First Unit Completed 1954 |
| Novosibirsk | Ob | 400 | Under Construction |
| Dubossary | Dnestr | * | 1955 |
| Irkutsk | Angara | 660 | Under Construction |
| Bratsk | Angara | 3,600 | Under Construction |
| Krasnoyarsk | Yenisei | 3,200 | Construction not yet Begun |
| Cheboksary | Volga | 800 | Under Construction |
| Saratov | Volga | 1,000 | Under Construction |
| Gyumush | Razdan | 224 | Completed Recently |
| Upper Svir | Svir | 160 | Completed Recently |
| Kremenchug | Dnepr | 450 | Under Construction |
| Uch-Kurgan | Naryn | 112 | Construction not yet Begun |
| Plavins | Western Dvina | 100 | Construction not yet Begun |
| Kamen-na-Obi | Ob | 500 | Under Construction |

* No Information Available.

SOURCES Kuibyshev *Pravda*, November 26, 1954, Stalingrad *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (The Large Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, 2nd ed., 1950, VII, 221, Kakhovka *Ibid.*, Tsimlyansky V. A. Winter, *Soviet Electric Power Development*, Moscow, 1952, p. 23, Gorky *Malaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (The Small Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, 1937, I, 897 (quoted in A. Lebed and B. Yakovlev, *Transportnoe znachenie gidrotekhnicheskikh sooruzhenii SSSR*, (The Importance of Hydrotechnical Projects for Soviet Transport), Munich, 1954, p. 99), Nizhnekamskaya *Voprosy sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki* (Problems of a Socialist Economy), Moscow, 1956, p. 94, Ust-Kamenogorsk, A. Lebed and B. Yakovlev, *op cit*, p. 112, Bukhtarma *Ogonek*, Nos. 8 and 38 (1953), Votkinsk *Voprosy sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki*, *op cit*, p. 94, Mingechaur *Ibid.*, p. 79, Novosibirsk *Ibid.*, p. 94, Dubossary *Izvestia*, April 26, 1954, Irkutsk *Voprosy sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki*, *op cit*, p. 94, Bratsk *The New York Times*, August 18, 1956, Krasnoyarsk *Ibid.*, February 5, 1956, Cheboksary *Voprosy sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki*, *op cit*, p. 94, Saratov *Ibid.*, Gyumush *Ibid.*, p. 79, Upper Svir *Ibid.*, Kremenchug *Ibid.*, p. 94, Uch-Kurgan: *Ibid.*, p. 95, Plavins *Ibid.*, Kamen-na-Obi *Ibid.*, p. 94.

The rivers of Siberia have enormous potentialities for the development of industries running on hydroelectric power. For instance, the Irtys River, 4,451 kilometers long, drops 100 meters in the 432-kilometer stretch between Zaisan and

² *Ogonek*, No. 2 (1953), p. 5.

³ *USSR Information Bulletin*, Washington, June 22, 1951, p. 363.

Ust-Kamenogorsk. On the other hand, the Volga drops only 200 meters over its 3,700 kilometers.⁴ The Ust-Kamenogorsk and Bukhtarma hydroelectric stations appear to be efficient and will produce comparatively cheap power. The Angara River could produce about 60 billion kilowatt-hours per year if all its potential were utilized.⁵

The power produced by the hydroelectric stations is only one of the advantages that will be derived from the new hydraulic engineering projects. Navigation will also be improved by the rise in the water level resulting from the construction of dams and canals. Moreover, the newly built irrigation systems will be supplied with water from the rivers on which the projects have been sited. However, in Central Asia and the Crimea the construction of some large irrigation systems has apparently been postponed until other, more important projects are finished. The ultimate goal of Soviet planners is to construct a unified deep water system capable of taking ships up to 10,000 tons on the main rivers.

Problems of Hydroelectric Plant Construction

Lack of Capital. The main hindrance to the development of hydroelectric projects seems to be lack of capital goods. Soviet planners have no difficulty in appropriating large sums from the budget for the construction of important projects, but the shortage of machinery, material, and skilled workers makes it extremely difficult for them to realize their plans.

Nevertheless, the problem of providing machinery for the projects has apparently been solved, although at great cost to the national economy as a whole. Here again the Soviet leaders have applied the system of using machinery to the utmost. Giant "walking excavators" with a capacity of up to 14 cubic meters have been used on all major projects.⁶ The Western view, however, is that such enormous excavators are inefficient.

Soviet newspapers nowadays frequently carry complaints from the leading hydroelectric projects about difficulties in obtaining essential material and equipment on schedule. For example, the leading article in *Pravda* on January 16, 1955 stated that the Kuibyshev project had claims against the Novo-Kramatorsk Works, the Ordzhonikidze Works in Chelyabinsk, and several other enterprises which had not delivered ordered equipment on time. These plants, in their turn, had been unable to meet the orders because of a shortage of certain raw materials.

Skilled Workers. There has been a constant improvement in the skill of the workers employed on the projects, due usually to experience gained at one construction site before transfer to another. The transfer of specialists from Tsimlyansky to Ust-Kamenogorsk,⁷ from the Dnepr plant to Kakhovka and then to Ust-Kamenogorsk,⁸ and from the Dnepr plant to Kakhovka⁹ can be cited as concrete examples.

⁴ *Ogonek*, No. 1 (1953), p. 9.

⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 50 (1953), p. 7.

⁶ *USSR Information Bulletin*, *op. cit.*, p. 363.

⁷ *Ogonek*, No. 1 (1953), p. 9.

⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 38 (1953), p. 15.

⁹ *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (The Large Soviet Encyclopedia), 2nd ed., Moscow, 1950, VII, 227.

It may well be true that labor productivity at the projects has been increasing considerably each year. Labor productivity per worker at the Kuibyshev station construction site was reported to have increased 19% between 1953 and 1954.¹⁰

Centralization of Control. The overcentralization of control has led to a certain amount of inefficiency throughout the industry. The limited resources available are not necessarily distributed in the most efficient way. In 1955 the large hydroelectric projects may have derived benefit from centralization because the Soviet government decided to allocate the majority of available resources to the most important key projects.¹¹ This improved the situation on these particular projects, but probably aggravated an already difficult situation on the smaller ones.

Overexpenditure and Faulty Cost Planning. The Soviet press has blamed the management of the largest projects for overexpenditures on construction due to poor labor organization, poor utilization of machinery, and to the practice of paying very high wages. For instance, in 1954, five leading hydroelectric projects had a 16.3 million rubles wages overexpenditure in nine months.¹² It would appear that the construction methods employed at the gigantic Soviet power projects are comparable with those used in the construction of American airfields in Morocco. In both cases, there was a noticeable tendency not to count the cost as long as construction kept up with the government schedule.

Problems of the Electrical Engineering Industry. The industry producing and installing electrical machinery is faced with the familiar problem of late delivery of material and parts, faulty cost planning, an oversized bureaucracy, and waste. On March 9, 1955 *Pravda* stated that in many cases Soviet industry wasted more than half the metal used in making a machine. Another example of wastage was given in *Izvestia* on February 24, 1955, which accused the Karl Marx Electric Motor Works in Voroshilovgrad of wasting more than 13 million rubles for the purpose of "additional construction" since 1944, without, however, adding a single square foot of new production space.

There are indications of a considerable lack of care in the manufacturing processes in the Soviet electrical industry. On October 6, 1954 *Izvestia* stated that blades were forged at the Leningrad Metallurgical Works, which meant that manufacturing tolerances had to be high. Western observers were able to notice some results of this when several American engineers went over a Soviet turbine at the Leipzig exhibition. One of them stated afterwards:

Its crude construction would have frightened a cost-conscious engineer from General Electric or Westinghouse. By U. S. standards the blades of such turbines would have a satin-like finish. The one displayed at Leipzig had blades made from rough castings and finished by a rough grinding job. When this turbine goes to work in a power plant, it will cost its owners money. The gravel finish of the turbine blades will cause a good deal of friction and the friction will lower the efficiency of the whole engine.¹³

¹⁰ *Pravda*, November 26, 1954.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Business Week*, New York, January 29, 1955.

Conclusions

To sum up, the general characteristics of the Soviet hydroelectric power industry are:

1. It is a very costly industry. Although modern methods have been used for the construction of hydroelectric projects, much of the country's already scarce capital resources are being swallowed up here.

2. The Soviet leaders have evidently decided to assign the greater part of their resources to the construction of hydraulic engineering projects, even if a greater return could be obtained by directing them to other industries. Power is essential for a growing Soviet industry and for defense, and is to be provided regardless of cost.

3. There has been a tendency to build thermal and hydroelectric stations in such a way that their capacities could be fully utilized.

4. The comparative costs of hydroelectric and thermal power industries have always been taken into account, but the former received preferential treatment. Now a more careful approach is being taken, as mentioned in the discussion of the recent article by Professor Weitz. There are now some doubts as to whether the hydroelectric power industry is always more efficient than the thermal power industry, even in regions where water power is available.

5. The future of Soviet water power utilization lies in the little developed and remote regions, whose development will remain a key problem.

(The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professor M. Gardner Clark of Cornell University for his kind assistance and advice.)

CURRENT SOVIET AFFAIRS

Foreign Policy

Bulgaria—A Cornerstone of the Soviet System

Among the Soviet satellites, Bulgaria occupies a special place. From the first entrance of Soviet forces into the country in September 1944, the Kremlin has spared no pains to consolidate its military, political, and economic position there. This is largely because of Bulgaria's considerable geopolitical significance, lying as it does at the gateway to the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. In the event of war the Soviets could sweep down the Bulgarian glacis towards the Straits and thence to the Near East. Bulgaria would be the base for a major attack south-westwards, for its position would facilitate rapid conquest of the Straits and the ports along the Aegean Sea. This offensive could well develop in two main directions: along the Vardar towards Salonika, and straight on to Istanbul. Thrace could be overcome within a few days.

Bulgaria would also play an important role in any attack on Tito's Yugoslavia; and any large-scale operation would also endeavor to establish direct land communications with Albania, which is already serving as a Soviet submarine base. A Soviet offensive against the Near East would also involve large troop movements along the Bulgarian Black Sea coast.

To enhance the nation's strategic position the Bulgarian Communist regime has been building a network of first-class highways and railroads along the Black Sea coast since 1945. The large Ruse-Giurgiu bridge across the Danube completed in 1954 was also constructed with its military significance in mind.

Within the past few years the Black Sea ports of Stalin (Varna), Burgas, and Sosopol have been converted into modern naval bases for use by Soviet vessels. Moreover, the Soviets have built ten large airfields for jet planes, particularly the Ilyushin IL 28 and the MIG's 15 and 17. The most important are at Tolbukhin, Yambol, Pleven, and Sofia. Although under the Paris peace treaty of 1947 the Bulgarian army was not to exceed 65,000 men, its present size is about 200,000.

Prior to the Soviet take-over Bulgaria had an insignificant naval force consisting of a few torpedo boats and mine-sweepers. Today they have been augmented to include a destroyer (the Georgi Dimitrov), three or four submarines, and 30 torpedo boats. In addition, large coastal defenses have been erected.

A further important military role ascribed to Bulgaria is its task of guarding the Black Sea from NATO naval forces in case of war. The comparative weakness of Communist naval forces in the area is being compensated by the development of Soviet air bases along the northern Black Sea coast, which, together with those in Romania and Bulgaria, form a semicircle with firm protection for the Black Sea. Thus, before considerable NATO naval forces could be deployed in this area, these air bases would have to be destroyed.

In view of recent developments in the satellite countries, particularly in Hungary and Poland, there is less likelihood of the Kremlin giving the satellites an offensive role in a future war, although it is quite possible that the Bulgarian armed forces would have to fight alongside Soviet troops on the Turkish and Greek fronts. In such an eventuality the USSR would most probably attempt to turn to good account historical differences between Bulgaria on the one hand and Greece and Turkey on the other, as well as the Bulgarian desire for an outlet to the Aegean.

A political error of far-reaching consequences was the failure of the Balkan pact countries, Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia, officially to acclaim Bulgaria's territorial inviolability. This provided the Communists with good propaganda material, since they had always argued that, in a new war, Bulgaria's southern and western neighbors would try to divide the country among themselves.

The importance of Bulgaria for the Soviets can readily be demonstrated. In November 1940 Molotov, at that time foreign minister, was in Berlin making a final attempt to bring about a rapprochement between Germany and the Soviet Union. When he asked Hitler to grant the USSR military bases in Varna and Burgas, Hitler rejected him brusquely. This controversy was the final straw, which soon led to a break between the two countries. Had not Bulgaria been of particularly strategic importance, Hitler would not have hesitated to sacrifice it to the Soviets, as he did the Baltic countries.

Political Coordination

Although Bulgaria was the only Axis power that did not declare war on the Soviet Union and never sent troops to the Eastern front, on September 5, 1944 the USSR announced that it considered itself in a state of war with Bulgaria. On the following day Soviet troops crossed the frontier into Dobrudzha.

The pretext for this invasion was the Bulgarian government's alleged refusal to take part in the war against Germany and the presence of German troops on Bulgarian soil. The annexation of Bulgaria followed, with the full agreement of the Western powers. In May 1944 Great Britain proposed, in the face of American opposition, that for the duration of the "military period" Bulgaria and Romania be kept under Soviet military control, while England take responsibility for Greece. During Churchill's visit to Moscow in October 1944 this period, at first restricted to three months, was lengthened. Soviet and Western influence was divided percentagewise: 75% to 25% respectively.

On September 9, 1944 the Bulgarian government was overthrown by a military *putsch* directed by a small group of officers belonging to the Zveno party, and the so-called Fatherland Front headed by Kimon Georgiev set up. The Fatherland Front, which in addition to the Zveno party comprised Communists, a small fraction of the leftist Agrarian Party led by Nikola Petkov, a few leftist Social Democrats, and a group of "independent" intellectuals, had been formed underground in 1942 with the support of Moscow and under the direction of Georgi Dimitrov. At the time it seized power, the Fatherland Front represented only a small portion of the Bulgarian people.

Economic Exploitation

Up to the end of 1946 a trade agreement was in effect between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria covering trade valued at \$73,000,000. A further agreement signed in Moscow in April 1948 and highly favorable to the Soviet Union established trade valued at \$90,000,000. Under the terms of this agreement the USSR was to deliver 100,000 tons of metal, 12,000 tons of cotton, rubber, and other items, while the Bulgarian exports were to include 22,000 tons of high-grade Oriental tobacco.

On January 19, 1949 a new trade pact was drawn up providing for a 20% increase over the previous year. Bulgaria was to deliver tobacco, zinc concentrates, copper, and cement. Another agreement was signed on February 18, 1950, this time envisaging a further 25% increase in volume. At the end of March 1953 a deal was made under which the Soviets were to export agricultural machinery, rolled steel, and petroleum, while Bulgaria was to ship to the Soviet Union the total output of the two copper plants near Burgas and of the metallurgical plant of the *Gorubso* lead, zinc, and coal mining company. The large Stalin Nitrogen Works built in Dimitrovgrad in 1953 with a capacity of about 600,000 tons of saltpeter delivered the greatest part of its output to the USSR. The most recent agreement was signed on February 19, 1957 in Moscow. Under it the Soviets are to export metal, coke, rubber, and petroleum, while Bulgarian exports are to include non-ferrous metal concentrates, ships, tobacco, shoes, furniture, and agricultural equipment. On the basis of this agreement the USSR granted Bulgaria long-term credit of 200,000,000 rubles to be used to develop industry. Earlier, on February 3, 1957, Moscow had stated that the Soviet Union would grant Bulgaria credit amounting to 300,000,000 rubles.

In June or July 1957 new trade agreements for the period 1958-60 are to be drawn up between the two countries. According to a joint statement signed on February 20, 1957 in Moscow it had been agreed that Bulgaria would continue to deliver uranium ores "at just and mutually favorable prices." However, no information was given on the volume or price of the ores involved. This was the first time that official mention of Bulgarian uranium exports had been made in the trade agreements.

It is reasonable to assume that the daily output of uranium ore from the Bukhovo mine near Sofia is about 1,000 tons. There are moreover, at least two other uranium mines in the country. All production of the ore is in the hands of the Soviet monopoly, and the Bulgarian government has little or no to say in the matter.

Trade relations between the Soviet Union and its satellites are run on the basis of legalized exploitation. The Kremlin uses its monopoly of trade with the Soviet bloc countries and their complete political dependence on the USSR to dictate its own trade terms. For their exports the Soviets arbitrarily fix their own prices, which are well above those on the world market, while the reverse is the

case in payment for imports. How the Soviets operate became clear from the terms of Polish deliveries, about which much has been said recently. A similar method has been observed in the case of Bulgarian tobacco, which after being exported to the USSR is often reexported by the Soviets to the West at much higher prices and for hard currency.

The inevitable result of this rapacious exploitation and a forced rate of industrialization which did not take the country's economic capacity into account has been a tremendous drop in the standard of living. In March 1953 the then prime minister Vulko Chervenkov announced the beginning of a new era in Bulgaria in which the living standard was to rise sharply in a very short time. However, he was careful not to say anything that might have been taken to mean that priority would no longer be given to heavy industry, even though a rise in the living standard would have been impossible without the development of the consumer goods industries. In spite of various price reductions and wage increases, there was no essential improvement in the population's purchasing power, since in the meantime certain rationed goods that had formerly been sold at controlled prices were derationed, and prices soared. For the last two years or so, there have been more goods in Bulgarian stores, but the people do not have the money to buy them because of the drop in value of their wages. Moreover, in the last two years unemployment has begun to present a big problem, particularly in the towns. It has been estimated that the number of people out of work is between 350,000 and 500,000, most of whom are industrial workers and salaried employees. Since the Communists must reject *a priori* the possibility of unemployment in a Communist system, present social legislation in Bulgaria does not provide for unemployment benefits.

An official publication published a decree to the effect that work would be found for those not engaged in production, but it was admitted that the country's industry was not in a position to absorb all the extra manpower made available by the mechanization of agriculture, the reorganization of many branches of industry and the growth in the population.

In collectivizing the economy by the end of 1955 Bulgaria had gone further than any of the other satellites. At that time 51% of the agricultural land had been nationalized and was farmed by workers' cooperatives. A new campaign carried out from January through March 1956 brought the total up to 80%, which in effect meant that agriculture had been completely collectivized, since the other 20%, which was in private hands, was in the mountain regions where mechanized farming was virtually impossible.

Compulsory collectivization also caused further unemployment, and the problem is likely to become even more serious during the coming years. On December 28, 1956, Deputy Premier Georgi Chankov stated in parliament that the superfluity of manpower was one of the major problems of the day.

A recent remark by Chankov, made when he was outlining the 1957 economic plan to parliament on December 25, 1956, is an excellent indication of the regime's

determination to remain firm to the Stalinist method of running the economy. He stated that the Stalin method ensured the further development of socialism, and reminded his listeners that on June 6 and 7, 1956 the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers had jointly declared heavy industry the firmest basis for developing the economy and strengthening agriculture.

Cultural Infiltration

The chief vehicles in the systematic Sovietization of Bulgaria are the so-called Soviet—Bulgarian friendship societies. However, these organizations are designed not so much to foster cultural cooperation and friendship between the two countries (as the name would indicate), as to make the Bulgarian people mentally an integral part of the Soviet Union. The campaign of cultural penetration being carried out by the Soviets in Bulgaria is more intense than in the other satellites. The Soviet leaders believe that the close affinity between the Russian and Bulgarian languages, and the fact that the Russians liberated the country during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 will help effect a mental rapprochement. The Soviet-Bulgarian societies, with a claimed membership of 1,500,000, give courses in the Russian language, arrange exhibitions and talks, show Soviet films, and distribute Soviet literature. In 1952, for example, these societies had 220,788 members engaged in active propaganda, and in the course of the year 4,267 Russian courses were held, 17,000,000 Soviet books imported, and 38,000,000 persons saw Soviet movies, this in a country with a population of only 7,000,000.

In February 1956 a reform was introduced, giving the impression that this feverish activity was to slow down. By a decision of the Sixth Congress of the Union of Soviet-Bulgarian societies passed on February 19, 1956, the organization was incorporated into the Fatherland Front. Since the Fatherland Front was now only a shadow this step was viewed as marking the beginning of the end of the societies and as an official recognition that pro-Soviet propaganda had had anything but the desired effect. This measure was followed shortly afterwards by the official rehabilitation of the national Communist Kostov.

However, after the lesson of the Hungarian revolution the Bulgarian regime had second thoughts, and on February 13, 1957 a conference of delegates of the Soviet-Bulgarian societies was held, at which it was resolved that the societies be made independent again. A National Committee for Soviet-Bulgarian Friendship, comprising 91 members, was thereupon elected.

Only the future can tell to what extent the attempts at Sovietization will have an effect. Of late, however, there have been signs of open rebellion against this mental indoctrination. For example, a Communist writer, Tudnikov, accused the Party Central Committee of directing literature "in a bureaucratic manner." Another writer, Pavel Vezhinov, even went as far as to say that Bulgarian authors had no spiritual freedom and were not allowed to choose their own way of writing, which resulted in their works being all alike.

The Latest Government Changes

On February 1, 1957 Prime Minister Anton Yugov announced changes in the government. Several ministries were combined on the pretext of economy and better central administration, including the ministries of culture and education, which were put under former Party secretary and premier Vulko Chervenkov, who, since his deposition in April 1956, had been deputy premier without portfolio. At the beginning of January 1957 head of the State Planning Commission Georgi Chankov was removed from his post and replaced by former Minister of Internal Affairs Russi Kristosov, who later became Minister of Supply. These changes are undoubtedly a major step in the consolidation of the power of the Chervenkov wing of the Party, which is absolutely true to Moscow. It had long been known that in spite of Chervenkov's official disgrace in April 1956 he had never fully lost his power.

This circumstance, together with the recent hesitation in completely rehabilitating the national Communists, indicates that the developments in Bulgaria are a direct outcome of the events in Poland and Hungary.

In connection with the visit of a Bulgarian Party and government delegation to Moscow, Prime Minister Yugov and Party Secretary Shivko announced on February 19, 1957 that the Bulgarian Communists want nothing to do with the developments in Poland and Hungary, condemn all forms of national Communism, and are firmly resolved to remain faithful allies of the Soviet Union. Yugov claimed that the Bulgarian Communists and the working class had been brought up for decades in the spirit of complete loyalty to the USSR and the Soviet Communist Party. He complained that Bulgaria had been termed a satellite because of this loyalty and that some Yugoslav newspapers had openly expressed their disappointment that Bulgaria had not witnessed such scenes as had taken place in Poland and Hungary. He added that if they were called Stalinists because they uncompromisingly rejected opportunism and revisionism, they were proud to bear this name. Shivkov echoed these sentiments in his speech.

The Moscow meeting was a demonstration of the loyalty of Bulgaria to the Soviet Union and was arranged for the benefit of those persons who were hoping to break away from the Kremlin. It cannot be pure chance that it was the Bulgarian Communist Party that was chosen to try to overcome the crisis that had occurred between the Kremlin and the satellites by strengthening the Soviet claim to supremacy throughout the so-called socialist camp.

Although there is every indication that the majority of the Bulgarian Party members have had their ideological beliefs badly shaken there has been no outward relaxation of the Communist dictatorship. Unlike the other satellites Bulgaria has shown no signs of a "new line" since Stalin's death. This is a further indication of the importance of the country in the Kremlin's plans.

S. Yowev

Current Sino-Soviet Relations

Recent events at home and abroad have clearly brought out some of the weaknesses of the Soviet collective dictatorship. Although it would surely be premature to speculate on the imminent demise of the current method of collective rule, it cannot be denied that Soviet authority and prestige have suffered serious setbacks. The boldness of opposition to Communism in Poland and Hungary, for example, are a direct reflection of a weakening of the Soviet system, a weakening resulting from the fact that there is no single strong man at the top. The death of Stalin left Mao Tse-tung as the only ruler of a Communist-bloc nation in a position to exercise full command over his political machine and through it, over his country. In the Eastern European satellites the Kremlin is constantly interfering in internal affairs.

During the last few months, China has begun to exert increased influence on the rest of the Communist bloc. Although it is not yet likely that Peiping will openly declare itself head of the world Communist movement, there is little doubt that the Chinese are thinking in terms of starting to take the reins in their own hands in view of Moscow's ineffectuality. The most important fact in support of this thesis was Chou En-lai's recent visit to Warsaw and Budapest. Hitherto, Eastern Europe had been the exclusive domain of Stalin and his heirs. Chou's appearance itself might not have been significant, but the reason which led to it certainly was: Soviet policy in the satellite countries was failing. The main purpose of the visit was to strengthen the link between the shaken East European bloc and the USSR, and everywhere Chou spoke, he constantly stressed the need to adhere to the Soviet Union and to remain united because of the imperialist powers' intentions of defeating the Communist nations one by one. Moreover, the statements contained a concealed threat: unity had to be preserved and China was now taking a direct interest in it. The "people's democracies" must now take into account the fact that in any attempt to leave the socialist bloc they would have to reckon not only with Moscow but with Peiping as well.

While Communism is still strong and dynamic in China, it is on the decline in the USSR. In the satellite countries it is maintained only by Soviet bayonets. Mao Tse-tung is well aware that the fall of Communism in the Soviet Union could cause in the satellites a chain reaction which would spread to China itself. Consequently, Communism must be preserved in every country on which it has been imposed. Hence the appeal for unity.

Having been forced to seek Chinese intervention in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Party Central Committee could not but withdraw somewhat from the area. From now on, Eastern Europe is likely to be more accessible to the Chinese, a supposition borne out by the meeting of five Communist countries which took place in Budapest, and further confirmed by Chou En-lai's negotiations with representatives of the various satellite countries, including East Germany.

Chou's visit to Moscow led to a kind of holy alliance of Communist governments. He spoke of the need to respect the national peculiarities of the different

socialist countries, but at the same time justified Soviet interference in Hungarian internal affairs as it crushed an "imperialist" venture. The Soviet and Chinese governments will be carefully following each other's domestic affairs, each ready to aid the other should anti-Communist forces threaten the existence of the Communist structure as a whole.

China's direct interest in the unity of the socialist bloc is clearly not preventing Peiping from maintaining that Moscow has lost the right to sole leadership of world Communism. The factional struggle within the Soviet Party Central Committee enhances China's position. Khrushchev's recent secret visit to Peiping shows which way the wind is blowing. The existence of differences in the Moscow leadership is beyond dispute and it is only to be expected that some of these groups should seek Mao Tse-tung's support. This puts Mao in an extremely favorable position.

This, however, is only part of the overall picture. Apart from the absence of unity in the leadership of the Soviet Party Central Committee—complete unity is apparently possible only under a single dictator—the Soviet leaders are now having to cope with increased feelings of opposition among the people, including the students and intellectuals. When Chou En-lai visited Moscow University, he carefully stated:

At the present time imperialism is conducting a tense struggle with us on the ideological front, as on all other fronts. Any inactivity in this sphere could prove to be extremely harmful. Our Chinese intelligentsia wish to act together with you and to go forward hand in hand.

As is known, Soviet student circles and writers have been the most restless groups of late. Chou did not address himself directly to writers, but later *Literaturnaya gazeta* published an article from the Chinese newspaper *Jen Min Jeh Pao*, the organ of the Chinese Communist Party, entitled "Problems of Literature and Art."¹ The Chinese newspaper's views have been more orthodox and anti-liberal in tone than those expressed by the Soviet leaders during the past few years. It asserted that fewer writers were employing the methods of socialist realism and the principle that art must serve the workers and peasants, and it appealed for complete adherence to this method.

During recent months the number of reprints of Chinese articles in the Soviet press has increased considerably. *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, and *Literaturnaya gazeta* are constantly publishing articles from *Jen Min Jeh Pao* on various ideological questions. Usually they lay down the general line of current policy, and attack deviationists.

During the great purges, Stalin liquidated almost all the Communist theoreticians, leaving Party bureaucrats (*apparatchiki*). The situation is complicated by the fact that not only are there few people left in the Kremlin capable of writing articles establishing general policy, but the various points of view held in the Presidium of the Party Central Committee are extremely difficult to reconcile.

¹ *Literaturnaya gazeta*, January 15, 1957.

Thus, the Chinese are presently forced to play a major role in the ideological reevaluation necessitated by the denunciation of the cult of the individual. On December 30, 1956 *Pravda* republished an article from *Jen Min Jeh Pao* entitled "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," together with a note indicating that the article was based on a discussion of the question held at a full session of the Chinese Politburo. Its main theses were: (1) to prove that the rejection of the cult of Stalin does not mean the end of Stalinism as such; (2) to both condemn and justify the actions of the Moscow Politburo during Stalin's lifetime and later during the campaign against the cult of the individual; and (3) to stress the need for the unity of the socialist bloc.

The condemnation of Stalin and the simultaneous justification of Stalinism is being brought about by a partial rehabilitation of the former leader. In Peiping's opinion Stalin committed many mistakes, particularly in his relations with other countries. Nevertheless, he was a sincere and honest Communist, a genuine Leninist, and had many good features. Even if some of the methods used by him to implement his policy must be rejected, the policy in itself was correct and should be pursued further.

Peiping then tackles a more difficult question, which the Kremlin did not dare to ask openly, even though the Soviet people must have asked it long ago: "Since the main path of revolution and construction in the Soviet Union is correct, why did Stalin's mistakes arise?" *Jen Min Jeh Pao* rather surprisingly states that the rule of the disappearance of the obsolete also applies to socialist and Communist societies, and asks whether Stalin's mistakes resulted from the fact that the Soviet socialist economic and political systems were already out of date and no longer fitted the requirements for the Soviet Union's development. In its reply, *Pravda* pointed to the growth of the Soviet regime and added that Soviet Communism was only 40 years old and hence there could be no question of its being out of date. *Pravda* attributed everything good done by Stalin to his Marxist outlook and the fact that he worked in a socialist society. Everything bad, on the other hand, was attributed to his personal character and to "remnants of capitalism" from which even the leader had not been completely free.

This argument casts doubts on one of the main principles of Communism—that the socialist system is superior to all others, and that this superiority is virtually uninfluenced by the will of the individual. Now it seems that this is not so and that the Communist leaders are just as subject to human weaknesses and mistakes as anyone else. The system remains, but, as Peiping admits, it does not guarantee that there will not be serious mistakes in practical application. Be this as it may, the rehabilitation of Stalin has been effected and *Jen Min Jeh Pao* asserts that Stalin's positive deeds will outweigh his negative actions.

On the whole, Stalin was invariably ahead of the stream of history, directed it, and was an implacable foe of imperialism. Stalin's tragedy was to be found in the very fact that even when he committed errors, he believed that what he was doing was essential to protect the interests of the workers from encroachments by enemies.

On this note the Chinese newspaper concludes its discussion. It now appears that Khrushchev exaggerated his disclosure of the negative traits of Stalin's character, and his Chinese comrades have been forced to restore the balance.

The second question brought up by *Jen Min Jeh Pao* touches on the Moscow Politburo's activity before and after Stalin's death and on the Soviet Union's role in the world and in the Communist bloc in particular.

During the 1920's and 1930's the Chinese Communist Party paid dearly for the interference by the Comintern and by Stalin in its affairs. At that time, it should be remembered, the Chinese Communists were pawns in the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky. In China, the chief political and most radical force is the peasantry. The Chinese Politburo stressed this on numerous occasions and vainly attempted to obtain Moscow's permission to ally itself with the peasants. Up to 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek broke with the Communists, Stalin placed his hopes on the Chinese bourgeoisie. Thereafter he pinned his faith on the numerically small proletariat. The uprising in Wuhang and the subsequent mass killing of Communists was the result of his policy.

In the 1930's Chinese Communism went more or less its own way, often ignoring the Comintern's directives. It was Mao Tse-tung's idea of creating a peasant army that eventually brought the Chinese Communists to power, even though Stalin became their acknowledged head.

Jen Min Jeh Pao wrote that "Stalin revealed a certain tendency towards great-power chauvinism in his relations with the brother Communist parties and brother countries. The essence of this tendency is the ignoring of the independent and equal position of Communist parties and socialist countries in the international union." Peiping then goes on to defend the present Soviet leaders, maintaining that, since Stalin's mistakes were not minor ones, they could not be corrected at once. Consequently, Communists and sympathizers must be patient and wait for them to be corrected.

The main point of the article was to show the need for unity among the countries of the socialist bloc. The argument begins with the statement that, although the "progressive" countries may sometimes disagree among themselves, their disagreements are completely different from the disagreements they have with the capitalist world.

These are not fundamental contradictions, they arise not from a fundamental clash of class interests, but from contradictions between correct and mistaken opinions, from contradictions between [certain] interests. The solution of these contradictions must be subordinated first and foremost to the overall interests of the struggle against the enemy.

Nevertheless, Peiping has foreseen the possibility that differences within the Communist camp may develop into fundamental contradictions and that an ensuing split could be breached only by force. This had already happened in Hungary, and the Communists feel that everything must be done to avoid a repetition.

There is an attempt to justify Soviet actions, even those which Peiping considers mistaken and harmful. But however much the Chinese support their Moscow comrades, their statements cannot but take the form of a condemnation. True, the article admits that the Chinese Communist Party has made many mistakes, but the implication that they are not so grave as those made by the Soviet Union is obvious.

In discussing the problem of chauvinism in the relations between large and small Communist parties the question of the need to suppress any feelings of nationalism in small countries is raised. The official Chinese Communist organ stresses that such chauvinism may prove to be even more dangerous than the Stalinist form as it leads directly to a split in the Communist bloc.

We Chinese Communists note with great satisfaction that the Polish and Hungarian Communist parties are presently seriously halting the activity of pernicious elements which are spreading vile, anti-Soviet rumors and inflaming national antagonism between brother countries, and that they have set about removing national prejudices existing among part of the masses and even among some Party members.

This statement was made only a few weeks after the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party had embarked on a course of greater independence from the Soviet Union and the delegates had been promised that the number of Soviet advisers in China would be sharply reduced. Obviously, the struggle against nationalism must be carried out in those countries which are unable by their own efforts to secure a position of equality with the more powerful countries inside the Communist bloc.

Jen Min Jeh Pao outlines directives for the future consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, increased centralization, struggle with deviationists, and the need for democracy in the form of more extensive participation by Politburo members in governing the country and in formulating domestic and foreign policies. This can be taken as an appeal to the Soviet government to increase its watchfulness and to put an end to the policy of involuntary liberalism. This appeal, coming from Peiping, consolidates Mao's position further.

Chou En-lai's visit to Eastern Europe may have another practical result in the process of Peiping's emancipation from the Soviet Union. The Eighth Chinese Party Congress drew up plans for industrializing the country more rapidly, which cannot be done without foreign aid. In 1950 China received from the USSR a loan of \$300 million, followed in 1954 by long-term credit of 520 million rubles.² The Chinese, however, had hoped for more.

Following the Soviet example, China is concentrating on building up her heavy industry. For this, much equipment is needed, and the USSR is at present quite unable to meet the demands. To date Moscow's help has come in the form of specialists, advisers, and economic mediation between China and the Eastern European satellites. Deprived of direct access to Eastern Europe, particularly to

² *Vneshnyaya trgovlya*, No. 10 (1954), p. 2.

such highly industrialized countries as Czechoslovakia and East Germany, China has had no alternative but to accept Soviet mediation. Thus, she had to pay commission to Moscow for Czech machinery, while at the same time Moscow resold Chinese raw material, at considerable profit, to the satellites. Chou En-lai's visit will almost certainly be used to try to gain Chinese economic emancipation from Moscow. While giving the USSR moral, diplomatic and military support, Mao Tse-tung will be after direct economic and political ties with Eastern Europe. However, this should not be taken as indicating that a form of Chinese Titoism is developing. The Chinese have attacked Tito in terms far stronger than the Soviet press had ever done.

A comparison of China and the Soviet Union on the ideological and political planes is quite favorable to the former. At present the Soviet Union does not have a single outstanding Marxist-Leninist ideologist. China, however, not only has Mao Tse-tung, but also Liu Shao-chi, the author of *How to be a Good Communist*. On the diplomatic plane China's stock is low only in Europe. In the East, particularly in southeastern Asia in the countries bordering on China, her influence is considerably greater than that of the USSR. North Korea and North Vietnam are already in Chinese hands, and pressure is being exerted on Burma, Ceylon and Siam. In India Chou En-lai is far more welcome than Khrushchev or Bulganin.

Chinese infiltration is also taking place in the Near East. During the Suez crisis Mao Tse-tung threatened to send 20,000 "volunteers" to Egypt, a threat which could easily have been carried out with the help of the Soviet Union. To the Arab countries, moreover, China represents a nation that has recently thrown off the colonial yoke.

In the West, China's position is weaker, but is nevertheless gaining strength. Even if Chinese influence in Europe remains less than that of the USSR, it does not alter the fact that the Soviet Union needs China's help and will continue to do so on an ever increasing scale.

The Eighth Chinese Party Congress noted the consolidation of Communism in the country. Complete collectivization has almost been achieved in the last three years (at tremendous cost), and a planned development of heavy industry has begun. In order to reduce her dependence on foreign specialists China is using skilled personnel from the country's bourgeoisie. Slogans are still capable of attracting the youth; that of industrialization is extremely popular, especially among the intelligentsia, whose role is extremely important in the Asian countries. Ever since the days of Sun Yat-sen Chinese intellectuals have dreamt of making China economically independent of the rest of the world.

The Congress of Chinese Writers held in September 1956 showed that Chinese Communism is feeling more sure of itself in the fields of art and literature. While in the Soviet Union the authorities are making a slow and forced retreat on the ideological front and East European writers are the leaders of the opposition, in China plans are being formed for a "twelve-year development of science and art," after which the only method left will be socialist realism.

There are grounds for assuming that China will continue to try and strengthen the outward authority of the Soviet Union. The weaker the reality behind the facade, the more insistent will be the Chinese appeals for unity around the USSR. The threat of the disintegration of the Communist bloc is very real, and the Chinese Communists realize that this would be a direct threat to the existence of Chinese Communism. Moreover, China can exert an influence in Eastern Europe only through the USSR. In any world conflict, China would undoubtedly feel safer if she were backed by the Soviet Union.

China's authority is being used in Russia in the struggle with oppositional forces and in China the situation is analogous. Internal enemies of Chinese Communism are constantly told that in the case of an open clash they will have to face not only the Peiping government but Moscow.

Mao Tse-tung is well aware that China is still far from ready to take over the leadership of world Communism. For one thing he has too many problems, particularly the need to industrialize the country as quickly as possible. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that the USSR and the satellites would willingly subject themselves to overt Chinese leadership. This, however, does not exclude the possibility of *de facto* leadership from Peiping. The situation within the Soviet Party Central Committee and the increasing need for the Soviet leaders to turn to Peiping for help are the main reasons for this. Mao Tse-tung does not need to declare Peiping the capital of world Communism to direct the Communist bloc as he thinks fit.

Although there is competition between China and the Soviet Union, the Kremlin is as much in need of the support of Peiping as the Chinese are of Moscow's backing for their actions.

A. Kashin

Domestic Policy

The Centralization-Decentralization Dilemma

It would be a mistake to view the events taking place inside the Soviet Union and the policy of the Soviet leaders, in particular the decrees on questions of economic management passed at the February plenary session of the Party Central Committee, as a series of measures logically evolving one out of the other. The course of present Soviet policy is, in fact, characterized not so much by tactical zigzags, as by abrupt switches. Thus, the Party Central Committee's December and February decrees on the organization of industrial administration and economic management appear to be essentially contradictory.

The decree of the December plenum was more or less in keeping with the Kremlin's policy of decentralizing economic control which began in May 1955 when Gosplan's functions were curtailed and the State Commission for Current Economic Planning created. On the other hand, the February plenum's decree heralds a clear return to the policy of centralization.

The first decentralization measures were taken in agriculture. Arbitrary planning from above—the method of the Stalin period—was condemned, and the lower levels, as far down as the general kolkhoz meeting, were allowed to show initiative not only in the sense of taking on additional state tasks, as had formerly been the case, but also in the choice of what they did, providing that the agreement of the local organizations and the necessary higher approval had been obtained.

Industry was next. In May 1955 Gosplan was divided into Gosplan and the State Commission for Current Economic Planning. The former was left only with theoretical long-range planning; actual and complete control of current economic problems was transferred to the Commission. The process of decentralization went hand in hand with the transfer of the more independent functions to union republic jurisdiction at one level, and to leading local economic officials (increased responsibility for directors of enterprises, for example) at another.

At the Twentieth Party Congress Khrushchev announced further steps towards decentralization, involving more independence for the union republics in economic affairs. It was further announced that an economic commission of the Soviet of Nationalities was to be created to be responsible for the working out of the principles of economic management within the framework of this process of decentralization. Yet, in spite of the fact that the principle of decentralization had been put into practice and a number of ministries actually transferred from all-union to republic jurisdiction, the commission was not set up until the sixth session of the Supreme Soviet on February 11, 1957, at a session of the Soviet of Nationalities. It consists of a chairman and two representatives from each republic, 31 persons in all.

About the time of the December plenum the rights and functions of the State Commission for Current Economic Planning were considerably increased. Its head, Mikhail Pervukhin, was given five deputy chairmen from the Council of Ministers as his assistants. In an article "What is Happening in Moscow?"¹ Boris Nicolaevsky wrote that this new organ, judging by its declared role, was probably more important in the country's economy than anything that had been created in the Soviet Union to date.

This decentralizing tendency continued up to the sixth session of the Supreme Soviet, which ended on February 12, 1957. The Economic Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities was created at this session, and Pervukhin himself gave fairly detailed answers to questions dealing with the future development of the Soviet economy and the way in which it was to be run.

It appeared that all problems had been solved by the state's highest legislative body. All the Commission for Current Economic Planning had to do was to put into operation the plan which had been outlined, while the Economic Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities was to develop the process of decentralization. However, the day after the February plenum wound up, a session of the Party Central Committee was held. It passed decisions which, even if not directly

¹ *Sotsialistichesky vestnik*, New York—Paris, No. 1 (1957), pp. 7—10.

contradicting those of the Supreme Soviet, were at complete variance with those of the December Central Committee plenum and the December decree extending the functions and rights of the State Commission for Current Economic Planning.

The decree of the February plenum of the Party Central Committee "Further Improvement in the Organization of the Supervision of Industry and Construction"² has two features which distinguish it from the decrees published during the last two years, particularly that of the December plenum. First, the functions and rights of Gosplan, the central organ of economic planning and management, which, as mentioned, had been curtailed in May 1955, are being restored, while the functions of the State Commission for Current Economic Planning, which had previously been expanded, are being considerably reduced.

There will be need to increase the role of Gosplan in the planning and supervision of the country's economy . . . It is essential to reorganize the work of the State Commission for Current Economic Planning, to simplify its structure and to make it less cumbersome; [it] must not duplicate the work of Gosplan and the other organs, must not interfere with the functions of administrative management: its duties are, together with current planning, to coordinate the work of the organs of administration of the economic regions in the execution of annual plans.³

Thus, the State Commission for Current Economic Planning, which in December 1956 had been placed in charge of the country's economy, in the following February was given the modest task of coordinating the economic regions' fulfillment of annual plans, the regions working according to a single centralized plan drawn up by Gosplan and supervised from the center by the Ministry of State Control through its local organs.

Second, a completely new principle of economic management has been introduced: control at republic level has been replaced by control based on new economic regions.

It is expedient to organize the management of industry and construction by basic economic regions . . . The management of industry on a territorial principle based on definite economic regions will make it possible to improve the use of local resources for the development of industrial production, . . . to put into order the business of specialization and cooperation in production . . .⁴

A large section of the decree deals with "bureaucratic narrow-mindedness" in industrial management, shortcomings and insufficient specialization and cooperation. It would appear to be directed not so much at the central ministries, as at the increasing departmentalization among the leading economic organs of the union republics. No mention is made of the role of the union republic Gosplan, or even of the role played by the local executive authority, the union republic councils of ministers, in the new system of leadership. It is obvious that management on a territorial basis will still be subject to control from the center.

² *Izvestia*, February 16, 1957.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

The decree places great stress on the principle of "democratic centralism," which implies unified centralized planning, unified control, and supervision from above, since independent management can be exercised only by the republic councils of ministers and not from the centers of the economic regions. Moreover, the decree clearly indicates that Gosplan will be responsible not only for centralized economic planning, but also for centralized supervision over it.

The increased importance of management and initiative in the development of industry applies not to the leading organs of the union republics, but to local, lower-level soviets, economic and Party organizations, and even to the trade unions.

The decree emphasizes that the organs of state supervision will function on an economic regional basis. They will be responsible to and directed by the All-Union Ministry of State Control headed by orthodox Stalinist Molotov. Hence, in spite of references to increased rights for union and autonomous republics, the decree heralds a return to centralization. This is at complete variance with the policy of decentralization carried out prior to the February plenum of the Party Central Committee.

The alteration in the organization of economic control is linked with the removal of Shepilov from his post as foreign minister on February 15, 1957 at a session of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the day after the Party plenary session and only three days after his speech on the Soviet Union's international policy had been approved. The whole process is a reflection of the embittered struggle being waged at the higher levels in the Communist state and which is having important effects on the country's domestic and foreign policies. Of course, other factors play an important role: domestic economics, the general international situation, and the reaction of the various groups of Soviet society to the hierarchy's policy. The various groups and individuals are trying to turn these factors to their own account in the struggle.

The results of the "liberal" policy and the dethronement of Stalin are well known. They caused an intensification of the struggle for power, and at the moment the orthodox Stalinists appear to have regained the upper hand. However, there is little chance of a return to a Stalinist one-man dictatorship, at least at present.

In spite of the fundamental changes in the principles of industrial management, one principle remains unchanged: Party control of all existing economic and administrative departments. An article in *Partiinaya zhizn*, "For the Further Improvement of Leadership of Industry and Construction," stated quite unequivocally:

The Party took and continues to take as its point of departure the fact that it is impossible under any circumstances to weaken centralism in the control of the country's economy, [that it is] necessary to preserve and improve centralized planning on a national scale, centralized accounting and centralized finances, and also improve supervision of the observance of general state interests and state discipline. Any weakening of the foundations of centralism would contradict the fundamental interests of the people and might give birth to tendencies to become

absorbed in questions of seniority and a striving to turn each economic region into a closed unit. This would have a disorganizing effect on the development of the country's economy in general.⁵

On March 30, the Soviet press published "The Theses of Comrade Khrushchev's Report on the Further Improvement of the Organization of the Administration of Industry and Construction," in which Khrushchev outlined his measures for reorganizing the economy as envisaged at the February plenum of the Party Central Committee. He proposed the complete abolition of the system of industrial ministries, which were to be replaced by economic councils created on the basis of economic regions. Stress was placed on the desirability of organizing the economic administration within the framework of the country's existing administrative and state division, that is within the boundaries of the existing oblasts, krajs and in a few cases republics. In a few union republics, particularly where there is no oblast division, economic councils are advocated. This is most probably because of the danger of bringing about complete chaos during the process of reorganization. Khrushchev also envisages the complete abolition of the State Commission for Current Economic Planning, whose functions were increased so much at the Party Central Committee's December plenum.

The problem of a unified state planning system has become especially acute. Gosplan is not only to be responsible for working out long-range, five-year, and annual plans but also for supervising their execution.

These new measures, like the decision of the February Central Committee plenum, do not constitute a decentralization of industrial management. They simply mean that economic administration is being concentrated in the hands of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Gosplan. The former method of a vertical system of ministerial administration is being replaced by a horizontal one of economic councils.

In spite of the attention given by Khrushchev to the question of increasing the rights of the union republics in economic administration, except perhaps in the case of the Gosplan of the union republics, his words were designed primarily for their propaganda effect. This is borne out by the fact that representatives of the union republic governments are to be included on the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Even this measure shows signs of the principle of "centralizing" administrative reorganization. This fusion of republic authority with the central control to a certain degree neutralizes rather than increases the independence of the union republics in questions of economic management.

It should be added that Khrushchev's plans have been submitted for general discussion and approval. The final decision on the reorganization of administration is planned for the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR slated for May 7.

The resulting fundamental changes in the leading organs of control of the country's economy cannot but lead to great confusion. In the future we may expect varied, at times even contradictory decisions and measures, which cannot but weaken the general structure of the Soviet system.

Y. Marin

⁵ *Partinaya zhizn*, No. 4 (1957), p. 5

The Economy

The Caspian Sea Problem

The Caspian Sea* has an area of approximately 430,000 square kilometers, and the normal level of its surface is some 26 meters below sea level. In a lake such as the Caspian, which is not connected with the sea, loss of water results from evaporation only. If at any time evaporation losses exceed water inflow the volume of water in the lake begins to decrease. This is followed by a drop in the water level, with a subsequent lessening of the surface area. If annual evaporation then remains constant there is a decrease in the amount of water lost. The decrease continues until a point of equilibrium is reached.

A systematic study of the water balance of the Caspian Sea, including such contributory factors as surface and underground flow, precipitation and evaporation, began only recently. Many difficulties have cropped up in the course of the investigations. Some factors, for example, the river flow, are comparatively easy to establish since they can be measured directly. But even on the Volga such measurements were not taken before 1877, while they were initiated much later on the other rivers, and in many cases were not carried out at all or only sporadically. On the other hand, it is extremely difficult to measure the volume of precipitation over such a large area as the Caspian, especially as precipitation takes place frequently each year and can be measured only from the shore stations. On the eastern side of the central Caspian annual precipitation amounts to only 100—140 millimeters, on the western side it reaches 200—240 millimeters, while in the southern and southwestern parts it is as high as 1,500 millimeters, dropping sharply again to 120 millimeters in the east.¹ Even greater difficulties are encountered in calculating the amount of surface evaporation, for it can be measured only by the use of evaporimeters at shore meteorological stations. In some cases evaporation can be determined indirectly by working out the water balance. As a result data on the water balance of the Caspian can only be approximate.

Between 1877 and 1945 the average water balance of the Caspian was as follows (in cubic kilometers per year):²

| | | | |
|--------------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------|
| Surface Inflow | 324.2 | Evaporation | 422.4 |
| Underground Inflow . . . | 5.5 | | |
| Precipitation | 71.0 | | |
| | <hr/> 400.7 | | <hr/> 422.4 |

Thus, for the period concerned, there has been a loss of 21.7 cubic kilometers per year, which has caused a drop in the level of the lake. However, the shortness of the time during which observations have been made and the unreliability of the

* The term "sea" is somewhat misleading, as in fact the Caspian is the world's largest salt water lake.

¹ *Bolskaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (The Large Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, 2nd ed., 1953, XX, 326.

² *Ibid.*, 327.

data have made it impossible to establish whether the drop that has taken place can be considered a result of periodical fluctuations brought about by climatic conditions, or whether it has been a steady process.

The annual surface inflow comes largely from the Volga, Ural, Emba, Terek, Sulak, Kura and Sefid rivers, although a number of lesser rivers also contribute. The main source is the Volga, which provides about 80% of the flow. Without undue exaggeration it may be said that the Volga determines the Caspian's inflow. It should be noted that the Volga basin covers an area of 3.6 million square kilometers and includes a large part of the European USSR.³ Thus, fluctuations in the Volga's flow reflect climatic changes not of small individual regions but of a large part of the European continent.

Between 1877 and 1945 the Volga's annual flow was 250 cubic kilometers, although with considerable variations. In 1897-98, for example, it dropped to 160, and was only 170 in 1909-10. The lowest figure was for 1920-21, when the flow fell to 130 cubic kilometers, only a little more than half the annual average for the period. Usually, a low year is followed by a considerable increase. Thus, after 1909-10 the flow increased, reaching 340 cubic kilometers by 1917, and after 1920-21 the maximum of 370 cubic kilometers was observed. This was more than 50% above the average and almost three times as much as the lowest known level.⁴

These results indicate that on the whole fluctuations were periodic. The variations in the level of the Caspian following on the changes in the flow from the Volga were thus no cause for alarm, since a rise could always be expected after a drop. A comparatively abrupt change in the flow involving a considerable volume of water causes a corresponding change in the level of the lake, although only after a considerable delay due to the enormous area covered by the Caspian. The water contained in the Caspian to a depth of only one meter totals more than 400 cubic kilometers. This alone could cover an annual loss of 20 cubic kilometers for 20 years. However, as the level drops the surface area decreases, thereby lessening the amount lost by evaporation, which in turn lengthens the period required before a final equilibrium is acquired.

Exhaustive computations made by the engineers of the Lower Volga project in 1933^{*} established that a diversion of 20 cubic kilometers of water a year from the inflow into the Caspian, disrupting the initial equilibrium between inflow and evaporation, could cause an ultimate drop in the water level of about one meter in 50—60 years.⁵

³ *Ibid.*, 325.

⁴ I. G. Aleksandrov, *Proekt orosheniya Nizhnego Zavolzhya* (The Lower Volga Water Power and Irrigation Development), Moscow, 1933, p. 253; V. E. Sproge, *Album chertezhei s poyasnitelnym tekstom k skheme irrigatsii Zavolzhya i uzlu gidrotekhnicheskikh sooruzhenii u g. Kamyslina* (Collection of Drawings with Explanatory Notes to the Lower Volga Irrigation Scheme and the Water Power and Navigation Development near Kamyslin), Leningrad, 1933, p. 5.

⁵ *Proekt orosheniya Nizhnego Zavolzhya*, *op. cit.*, pp. 72—3

* These calculations were carried out under the general supervision of the author.

The Soviets recently released information confirming that the level of the lake is falling constantly, having dropped 2.5 meters from 1929 through 1956. During the same period the surface area shrunk by 35,000 square kilometers.⁶ The process has been going on so long and has been so intense that it clearly cannot now be attributed to normal periodic fluctuations. It is also having a serious effect on the national economy. The shallow areas of the Caspian are at the northern end of the lake where the low salinity of the water and the abundance of nutritive benthos and plankton particularly favored the fishing industry. However, about 80% of the surface shrinkage has taken place in this area. As a result catches of fish there have been halved with losses put at 500 million rubles annually.⁷ The heavy blows inflicted on the fishing industry have been aggravated by the construction of dams on the Volga, particularly at Stalingrad, which deny fish access to spawning grounds. Although such species as sturgeon will not be affected, the catches of cartilaginous fish, many varieties of herring, for instance, will decrease sharply, perhaps disastrously.

The drop in the level will also have an effect on other branches of the industry. Water transportation and the petroleum and chemical industries will be some of the chief sufferers.

The worried reports from the Soviet Union give rise to a number of questions: first, is the present drop in the level of the Caspian due to periodic changes, with the probability of a halt and subsequent rise, and if so, how long will it be before the position begins to change and how long will the change take? Second, is the drop a result of the intensification of hydraulic engineering construction in the Volga basin? Third, what steps can be taken and to what extent can they remedy the situation?


As already mentioned, since 1929 the level of the water has dropped 2.5 meters. To make up the losses for this period water equivalent to a depth of 2.5 meters would have to be provided. This would amount to 960 cubic kilometers, an annual average of 35 cubic kilometers for the 27 years concerned.⁸ A decrease of 35,000 square kilometers in the surface of the Caspian lessens evaporation by 28 cubic kilometers a year. Consequently, had the deficiency of flow really been no more than the 22 cubic kilometers already indicated, the level would have already ceased to fall. However, as this is not the case, the original loss of flow must have been more than the average of 35 cubic kilometers a year. From this it follows that the level will continue to drop. This steady fall is connected not so much with the 10—11 year cycle in the flow that has been observed on the Volga over the period that observations have been made, as with climatic cycles of greater duration.

American meteorologists have established that over the past 75 years the average world temperature has increased by one degree, reaching as much as five to six degrees in some areas. The American meteorologist Hurd C. Willet

⁶ *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, November 2, 1956.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*



of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology links these variations with the sun spots and asserts that they have an 80—90 year cycle.⁹ A phenomenon comparable to the drop in the level of the Caspian is the recession of the Swiss glaciers which has been going on for the last hundred years.¹⁰

Thus, it is safe to assume that, even if the drop in the level of the Caspian Sea is only a cyclic phenomenon, the length of the cycle has been so great as to preclude any hope of restoring the normal level within the next few decades. However, immediate steps are necessary to annul or alleviate the effects the process is having on the Soviet economy.

Hydraulic engineering projects are not responsible for the Caspian's loss of water. The Volga dams and their huge reservoirs have not yet been finished, and their total volume is insignificant compared with the 3.6 million square kilometers of the Volga basin. Finally, their surface evaporation, even if it were of importance (which it is not), could not be termed a total loss, since, in view of the size of the Volga basin, most of the water would be returned in the form of precipitation. Nor could the additional extraction of water from the Volga for irrigation purposes, which for the same reason cannot be termed lost, have had a noticeable effect, since the increase in the area being irrigated in the Volga region could hardly have been on such an enormous scale.

There are basically three ways in which the problem could be tackled practically: (1) introduce measures designed to adjust the credit side of the balance, that is increase the flow of water without affecting evaporation; (2) lessen the deficit by decreasing evaporation through reduction of the surface area; and (3) leave the adverse balance as it stands but take steps to combat its effects.

For the past 20 or 30 years various proposals have been put forward. One designed to supplement the flow was propounded by Professor K. Rizenkampff in the early thirties. He proposed diverting part of the Don's water through the Volga—Don Canal into the Volga and hence to the Caspian Sea. But the diversion of 25,000 cubic kilometers of fresh water (almost the whole of the Don's annual flow) in order to supplement the salt water of the Caspian would have deprived the Don steppes of water needed for irrigation, and the project had to be rejected. After the Volga—Don Canal had been built, the project became technically impossible.

Another long-standing project is the "northern feed" plan, which envisaged diverting to the Volga, across the Kama—Pechora divide, the flow of the upper reaches of the Pechora, the Vychegda and other northern rivers, partially by gravity and partially by pumping. This would have necessitated a Kama—Pechora reservoir on the upper reaches of these rivers. It is believed that up to 40 cubic kilometers of water a year could be diverted in this fashion.¹¹ However, the pumping of such an enormous amount of water cannot be justified economically,

⁹ *Life*, Chicago, August 27, 1956, p. 117 *et seq.*

¹⁰ *Schweizerische Bauzeitung*, Zurich, October 29, 1956.

¹¹ *Radio Moscow*, November 10, 1956.

and there is no basis for the assertion that the diversion of water would increase the output potential of the hydroelectric stations of the Kama—Volga series, which would have been some justification. The utilization of water power on the steeper slope down to the White and Barents seas would undoubtedly provide much more favorable conditions for hydroelectric development.

One of the projects designed to make up the deficiency of the flow into the Caspian was the Davydov project, which during the last years of Stalin's life received wide-spread publicity, particularly in connection with the so-called Stalin transformation of nature.¹² Its basic feature is the creation of huge reservoirs on the Ob and the Yenisei and the diversion of water of Siberian rivers across the Aral—Irtys divide into the basin of the Caspian Sea. The dam on the Ob below its confluence with the Irtys would raise the water level of the Ob reservoir 75 meters above sea level. Its surface area would reach 250,000 square kilometers, stretching up along the Ob, Irtys and Tobol to the northern slope of the Aral—Irtys divide (the Turgai Gate). The divide would be pierced by a canal with an average excavation depth of 40 meters, reaching a maximum depth of 75 meters. This canal would be 930 kilometers long and the water in it 20 meters deep. Further on, the canal is to turn into a fresh water sea, and to lead into the Caspian. The overall length of this water tract is to be 4,000 kilometers, of which the canal will make up more than 2,200 kilometers. The second phase of the project is the construction of a second reservoir on the Yenisei linked with the Ob reservoir by the Ob—Yenisei canal. The project aims not only at making up the loss of water from the Caspian Sea, but also at irrigating large areas of Central Asia, improving navigation and utilizing the available power. Davydov proposes diverting a total of 350 cubic kilometers of water a year via this canal. This is almost 50% more than the annual Volga flow. Of this figure 250 cubic kilometers would be used to irrigate the land and 100 to supplement the Caspian. The 250 cubic kilometers would permit about 50 million hectares of land to be irrigated (an idea of the magnitude of this project is given by a comparison with India, where only about 20 million hectares of land are irrigated after centuries of development.)¹³ At present three million hectares of land are irrigated in the Soviet Union, including the Central Asian regions. The cost of irrigation alone would undoubtedly exceed 250 billion rubles, not to mention the cost of settling this vast area, which is completely uninhabited except for nomadic peoples. It would take decades and make enormous demands on manpower before the scheme could be realized. Moreover, for the period of most of the work, the canal from the Ob reservoir will be dead capital, since almost all the project would have to be completed before it can start functioning. The size of the Ob reservoir, according to the author's calculations, would be 4,460 cubic kilometers, and the average annual flow of the Ob against the dam 327 cubic kilometers a year.¹⁴ Taking into account losses due to evaporation from the reservoir (with an ultimate surface area of 250,000 square kilometers), it would

¹² *Geografiya v shkole*, No. 3 (1949), pp. 13—19.

¹³ *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Chicago-London-Toronto, 1951, XII, 690.

¹⁴ *Geografiya v shkole*, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

take at least 25 years to fill it initially. Assuming that this fantastic project is started, the canal and the reservoir would take at least 15 years to build. This is not, however, very long. No water would be diverted to the Caspian for at least 35 years, and it would be considerably longer before the balance could be restored.

Thus, it is clear that Davydov's project is unrealistic and cannot seriously be regarded as a method of solving the Caspian problem. It is interesting to note that no mention was made of it by the Soviets in such publications as the report on the World Energy Conference in Paris in 1956. It is even more noteworthy that at a conference called by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in September 1956 on the Caspian Sea question, the project was not even mentioned. At the same time in the general and popular scientific press and even in some specialist publications Davydov's project is mentioned in such tones as to give the impression that it is already completed or work is well under way. For example, Vyshinsky once said on the occasion of an atomic explosion that whereas in the West atomic energy was being harnessed for destructive purposes, in the Soviet Union it was being used to divert rivers.

A much more realistic solution, and one which could be carried out more easily, would be to try to decrease the losses due to evaporation. This would entail isolating certain parts of the Caspian by the construction of dikes. The greatest effect could be achieved by blocking the narrow strait of the Kara Bogaz Gol to form a lake. This strait is only 150 meters wide and five to six meters deep.¹⁵ In the gulf, which has an area of about 20,000 square kilometers, approximately 18 cubic kilometers of water a year is lost by evaporation. At present this is made up by the waters of the Caspian, which enter continuously at the rapid rate of 2.8 to 8 kilometers an hour. A dike cutting off this area would thus help make up the loss.

Sulphates, particularly Glauber salt, are obtained in winter along the shores of the gulf of Kara Bogaz, whose salinity is more than 30%. If the channel were blocked the salts could be obtained by simply taking them from the bed of the drying lake.

Similar polders cutting off shallow areas are also possible on the northwestern shores of the Caspian, where the depth does not reach five meters. The dikes would have to be very long, but equally long ones have been built in Holland. Objections on the score that this would cause unfavorable climatic changes in the neighboring regions and would have an effect on the flow of the Central Asian rivers are quite without foundation. The climate, humidity, and flow are determined by the moisture brought from the Indian and Atlantic oceans and the role played by the Caspian in making up the climate in the areas is negligible. The mere proximity of expanses of water does not exclude *per se* the formation of deserts. The Kara-Kum and Kyzyl-Kum deserts, which make up the whole eastern bank of the Caspian, can be cited as examples.

¹⁵ *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, op. cit., 1954, IV, 325.

However, the most radical measure of all would be not to attempt to transform nature but to increase the depth of the water for navigation. This could best be done by building canals and excavation, and by increasing the moorage space and the size of the moles in ports. This would be cheaper and would have immediate results.

The position is far more complicated as far as the fishing industry is concerned. In this respect a proposal by one Soviet expert, Professor Apollov, is of interest.¹⁶ He suggested raising the level of the water in the shallow northern part of the Caspian by constructing a dike 450 kilometers long to cut off the shallow, northern end from the central southern region, thereby creating a northern Caspian reservoir. The dike would raise the northern level two meters, and channels in it would permit excess water to be let out into the central part and allow the passage of shoals of fish. At present the depth of water in the northern Caspian averages no more than three to three and a half meters. An increase of two meters would meet the requirements of navigation and would once more make this area a spawning ground and fishing center.

The construction of such a reservoir and the subsequent increase in the surface area would not, of course, improve the balance of the Caspian, and would indeed bring about a further drop in the level. But as can be seen from the map on page 35 this drop would occur only in the deep southern part of the lake where it would not have the same catastrophic effect on the economy as would be the case with a drop in the level of the northern part. In building the ladder of sluices that would be necessary this further drop would have to be taken into account.

W. Sproge

Soviet Centralization of Scientific Research

Following the February plenum of the Party Central Committee the Soviet central press began to emphasize its fears concerning the lag of Soviet engineering behind that of the West. A group of members of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR headed by the Academy's director of the Institute of Machine Construction, A. Blagonravov, recently declared that the dragging out of research over many years prevented valuable scientific discoveries from being put into application, resulting in the USSR falling behind other countries.¹

The existing system of research institutes has not proved a success. It has resulted in a scattering of research personnel and a harmful parallelism with duplication of effort. At the moment, most Soviet industrial ministries have their own technological institutes with very little variation in their organization and research programs. In some cases several institutes attached to the various ministries are located in the same city. Scientific problems common to related branches of industry are worked out separately by each institute with very little

¹⁶ *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, November 2, 1956.

¹ *Izvestia*, March 20, 1957.

exchange of information. There are dozens of similar institutes in the machine-building field alone, while a large number of special laboratories working at the same problems are attached to engineering schools and large factories. Considerable sums of money are spent maintaining thousands of scientists and engineers whose work produces few results; for research workers and finances are divided in such a way that research institutes are not able to maintain adequately equipped experimental centers.

Many Soviet research institutes and establishments are located in the main cities, far away from the industries they are supposed to serve.

An extremely weak spot in the network of scientific establishments is their concentration in the capitals. A situation in which almost forty percent of the scientific establishments of the RSFSR are situated in Moscow and Leningrad cannot be tolerated any longer. In the case of the establishments of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR this percentage is as high as seventy. It is essential not only to move the base of these institutes to the periphery and above all to the east, but also to create new institutes there by attracting local cadres.²

Soviet designers and engineers are not systematically producing the new machinery and equipment necessary to keep Soviet industrial production on a level with that of the West. The State Committee for New Technology has admitted that:

In the past year the Ministry of Machine Construction did not cope with the task of mastering new techniques and introducing advanced technology. Out of 660 machines which were to have been made in accordance with the ministry's plan, only 545 or 82.6% were completed. The fulfillment of the state plan was even worse: instead of 147 machines, 104 or 71.4% were turned out. The unsatisfactory fulfillment of the plan for the output of new machines is a result of the poor work of the research institutes, the TsKB [Central Design Office] and SKB [Special Design Office].³

In an article, "The Removal of Bureaucracy is an Important Condition for the Speeding-Up of Technological Progress," *Pravda* reported that bureaucratic organization prevented the implementation of a number of important new industrial techniques, such as continuous coking, continuous steel production, and the use of oxygen in iron and steel smelting.

Khrushchev's speech "The Further Improvement of the Organization of Control of Industry and Construction"⁴ stated that in 1956 there were 496 research institutes attached to those ministries responsible for industry. These employed 45,000 people, an average of 80—90 per institute. Forty percent of these establishments were concentrated in Moscow and Moscow Oblast and subordinated to 40 ministries and agencies. In Leningrad 76 similar research institutes employed 8,500 workers.⁵

² *Ibid.*

³ *Promyslenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, March 6, 1957.

⁴ *Pravda*, March 25, 1957.

⁵ *Izvestia*, March 30, 1957.

The majority of Soviet research establishments are now to be moved to the corresponding industrial and economic regions away from the center. After the envisaged changes, highly specialized branch and inter-branch institutes will form the basis of the scientific agencies serving industry. Their activities will be coordinated by one of the leading institutes engaged in similar work.

After the abolition of the industrial ministries the new centralization will mean that the reorganized network of research establishments will be controlled by a special organ located in Moscow. The latter was formed as a result of the February Central Committee plenum's decisions and is to lay down policy for scientific research. This organ will be aided in its work by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, leading institutes, major engineering schools, and technical societies. The so-called leading research institutes will, moreover, be subordinated to Gosplan, which is to be responsible for a single, centralized policy in the development of the most important branches of industry.⁶ Thus, the decentralization of research establishments throughout the USSR, which is as it were geographic in character, is pursuing strategic aims. In fact scientific research will be centralized to a degree which increases Party and government control more than ever before.

G. A. Vvedensky

Soviet Society

Soviet Youth's Attitude to the Communist Regime

Konstantin Simonov once wrote a play entitled *A Lad From Our Town*, whose young hero dreamt of raising the red banner of Communism over the whole world. This type of formula, propounded at the command of the Soviet propaganda experts, was, until quite recently, the basis on which some people in the West, particularly the leftist intelligentsia, formed their judgments on the moods prevailing among Soviet youth. They argued that Soviet youth, from the kindergarten to the university, is molded in a distinct fashion, and is taught quite definitely that everything favorable to the Communist regime is moral while anything hostile to it is immoral. To the question of whether many youths rebel strongly against the moral principles of the society in which they have to live, by projecting onto Soviet youth the psychology of their counterparts in a democratic society, they arrive at the answer, No!

However, in totalitarian countries the general susceptibility to education and upbringing is not the same as it is in a democratic country. Personal freedom, the opportunity to realize one's own hopes, and the choice of a way of living are so limited that in even the most insensitive person there begins to develop a painful, almost physical feeling of constraint. Many secretly turn off the path of Communism, which they are obliged to follow, into the unknown. Non-conformity, rebellion, and encroachment on the social tenets become, in a

⁶ *Ibid.*

totalitarian state, the lot of many persons, who, had they been in a democratic society, would most probably have remained decent, law-abiding citizens. However, the framework of totalitarian conformity is too narrow and the sacrifices demanded are too great. A great strain is built up, and a rupture must occur somewhere.

The demands made by the Soviet leaders on the youth of the country are clearly expressed in the slogan "Sacrifice the Private for the Communal." By "communal" the authorities mean all that is covered by the regime's current demands. The slogan is repeated scores of times at innumerable meetings everywhere in the Soviet Union and the Party administration does its utmost to compel people to live up to it. In practice the phrase means among other things the renunciation of personal choice of profession. The conscientious Soviet citizen must choose his profession not according to his inclinations but in accordance with the needs of the state. It means renunciation of the choice of the place of work. The "young builder of Communism" must be prepared enthusiastically to leave his wife and family, his friends and the amenities to which he is accustomed and go to the virgin lands or to the wastes of Siberia. Every specialist completing his course of studies is compelled, if he wants to avoid unpleasant consequences, to work for three years at an appointed place. The slogan also means the sacrifice of leisure time. The ideal young Communist must be prepared to spend his free time on so-called community work, which frequently consists of such tasks as explaining to underfed workers living in barracks why it is such a great fortune to be a citizen of the first proletarian state in the world. Even as far as relations between the sexes are concerned Soviet youth is not free of interference from the Komsomol and the Party, which have the authority to direct the personal affairs of their members.

Who are these Komsomol members, the "activists," who fuse, organize, and lead the masses? At least they appear to be conformists. However, the appearance of conformity is only superficial; they preach conformity, but do not practice it. The ideal Komsomol member prepared to sacrifice himself and others for the triumph of Communism is a thing of the past. The modern Komsomol leader is first and foremost a calculating careerist. He is prepared to go to the virgin lands, but not for more than a few months, and only in order to make political capital from his visit. There he can direct the masses for a while, and then return under some pretext or other, such as the need to attend a study course. Such people depend upon the regime, and they support it, but it remains for them only a provider. While acclaiming the virtues of ideals they themselves are completely without them and are indifferent to everything that does not affect their careers. This becomes particularly clear from contact with their private lives. Whereas among people who are not completely in agreement with the regime discussions on politics and other burning questions are normal, such discussions, even in the most orthodox spirit, would greatly alarm the activists. Wages, jobs, clothing, sports, fishing, anecdotes designed not to compromise the teller, and women are the usual topics of their conversation. If an ideological theme were to come up in the course of conversation it would probably be squelched by a suggestion

that it would be better not to talk shop. On the whole, the activists are people with a great desire to reach the top via the shortest possible route, unburdened by superfluous moral prejudices, and, although perhaps not disbelieving what they say, at least not fully connecting it with their actions. Frank cynics, people who in the company of their intimate friends say that they were collaborating only for their piece of the public pie, are rare. So, too, are persons genuinely prepared to sacrifice themselves for what in their opinion is the common good. Such idealists are to be found only among youths from 15 to 17 years old, who do not know life and have been taken in by official propaganda.

In theory the call to make these sacrifices applies to everyone, but in practice people with influence or in privileged positions can always make sure that their children are not called upon. The vast majority of the younger generation, however, can only struggle to escape the excessive demands made by the Soviet system, and, if unsuccessful, submit. Such a state of affairs causes wide-spread dissatisfaction. The authorities' constant interference in the private lives of the younger generation and their constant efforts to keep youth under their supervision means that passive dislike of the regime has spread among those people whom Aldous Huxley called private-lifers. This dissatisfaction unites youths of completely different cultural and social levels. It is the chief but by no means the only reason for the hostility shown by youth to the regime. There is also dissatisfaction with the material state of affairs, a strong feeling of moral indignation at the government's monstrous crimes, and a general desire for political and spiritual freedom.

The feeling of not being able to control one's own fate or dispose of one's own leisure time begets passivity and lack of faith in the future on the one hand, and a desire to escape, to save one's private life from oblivion and to protect at any price one's family from needless suffering on the other. All the measures taken by the Soviet leaders founder on the shoal of passivity. A stubborn but mute refusal to lead the whole of one's life in accordance with directives and to sacrifice it in the interests of the rule of the masses disrupts the Party's plans. Party and Komsomol activists do their utmost to overcome this type of inert opposition and constant appeals to enthusiasm, Soviet patriotism, and socialist consciousness are made. These appeals usually go unheeded. People leave the virgin lands, refuse to go to Siberia as "volunteers," dodge community work, feign illness, and under various pretexts get out of the interminable meetings. The ultimate result is that people with criminal records have to be sent to the virgin lands, resulting in extremely poor labor discipline, drunkenness, and brawling. Attempts made at the Siberian projects to replace released prisoners with young volunteers, about whom the Soviet press had so much to say in the spring of last year, have clearly not been a success. Every year thousands of young specialists who have completed their studies at universities or technical institutions refuse to leave the cities and their families to spend the prescribed three years in the remote provinces. Although in many cases the authorities manage to overcome this resistance by threats or pressure, such methods are hardly likely to win new sympathizers.

In the summer of 1956 the Party tried to assemble in Moscow young volunteers to help with the harvest on the virgin lands. At first, exhortations were used, but it soon became obvious that this was leading nowhere. So the payment of grants to students refusing to go was postponed until the fall. This of course did not effect the children of well-to-do parents, but many of those who depended upon these grants had to yield. Naturally, such methods of "persuasion" cause dissatisfaction with the regime. This feeling constantly mounts, turning eventually into dislike and disbelief. Moreover, it is naturally felt that personal interests are in opposition to those of the regime, thereby aggravating the hostility felt towards the authorities and steps taken by them. This can be called a mood, an emotional attitude towards the regime rather than an opinion concerning it. In practice, this mood finds expression in the general striving to keep as aloof as possible from official public opinion, to avoid thinking about social problems, as far as possible to escape the burdens imposed by the system, and to build up one's own private life. Thus, people set themselves up against the state and its demands that every one participate unconditionally in the building of socialism. They commit to memory the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism and master the "historic decisions of the Party and the government," which they are obliged to study at the compulsory seminars and political activities classes, but promptly forget as soon as they can. Many do not even bother to read the newspapers, arguing that if there were a war they would soon find out, while most other topics are of no interest. Such attitudes, however, have no effect on the Soviet authorities.

The need to keep a constant watch over the little world some people have been able to create for themselves and guard against attempts to encroach upon it fosters dissatisfaction with and even enmity towards officialdom. In countless hundreds of people these feelings have no connection with definite political views. Some, dissatisfied and deceived by Soviet propaganda, which has isolated Soviet citizens not only from the outside world but also from one another, at least partially believe what they are told, particularly when it concerns life abroad.

The confused and undefined enmity has penetrated even the most simple, uncultured and least demanding section of the youth, and is of enormous significance. First, it indicates that the Soviet totalitarian regime has not succeeded in creating unconditionally obedient robots, entirely devoid of feeling and ideas. Second, all Party and government measures requiring initiative and sacrifice are destroyed by the indifference with which they are met. Third, dissatisfaction, albeit only half conscious and purely emotional, makes youth unreceptive to attempts at "ideological reeducation." On the contrary, it makes it extremely receptive to the ideas and system of values labeled "bourgeois ideology" in Party jargon. Thus, on January 8, 1957 *Trud* wrote: "Of late we have become even more frequently witnesses of the enthusiasm of a part of the student youth for vulgar bourgeois literature, formalistic painting, and wild jazz music." Such complaints are common nowadays. They indicate that the politically indifferent majority of youths are potentially anti-Communist. Finally, this mute, long-standing enmity

towards the regime feeds the conscious anti-Soviet moods of those who dare to express views which are "unhealthy from the political point of view," as *Trud* put it. These young people realize that what they say will fall on receptive ears.

Passivity, lack of faith in the future, and attempts to ward off Party pressure at any price frequently give rise to blatant egoism, amorality, indifference to the sufferings of others (sometimes turning into criminally anti-social moods which penetrate the consciousness even of honest people), and a feeling of being lost. In spite of the constant praising of collectivism, Soviet life with its atmosphere of denunciation and terror frequently gives rise to introspection, unsociableness, and even animal individualism.

These feelings and moods also help determine the psychological reaction of Soviet youth to the regime. Although youth is united in its passivity and its dislike of the demand for personal sacrifice for the sake of the whole, there are great differences in the further reaction to Party and administrative pressure. After refusing to follow the path laid down for them, many become lost, not knowing what to do. In this respect a poem written by a student and attacked by *Komsomolskaya pravda* is interesting. One verse runs: "I do not know where to go, or which path to choose whither. My voice is soft and meant for my friends. Oh! please lead a blind girl." The reference to which path to choose implies that the point in question is not merely the choice of the way to take but also the loss of definite moral values which should serve as milestones on this path. The authorities are loud in their advocacy of "Communist morality," which in essence is nothing more than unquestioning obedience to the Party's commands. The majority of youth rejects them, but as a result often finds itself in a moral vacuum from which the only outlet is an idyllization of destruction (as opposed to building Communism which appears senseless to them) and criminal orgies (a reaction to the rigidity of the socialist state).

Many people are affected by such moods, which find their most extreme expression among the *stilyagi** and the hooligans. They reject outright demands that they subordinate themselves completely to society, that they study in order to help build Communism, and that they hate capitalist America. Their answers are straightforward: no subordination and everything is lawful; let the fools study; and long live America. A curious feature of their defense of America is that they have a completely false impression of the United States, quite in keeping with the Soviet propaganda claim that it is a country ruled by gangsters and venal politicians, while the workers live in obedience and poverty. The *stilyagi* have made a fetish of such external features of West-European and American life such as jazz and fashion, and, indeed, good friends will become mortal enemies over a mere item of foreign dress. On the other hand the Soviet authorities and the Soviet way of life are hated and treated with a bravado which usually finds expression in trivialities. For example, a *stilyag* will paint the red door of his apartment yellow on the pretext that he does not like red, or put his feet on

* Based on the Russian word for "style," and approximately equivalent to the American zoot suiter or the British teddy-boy.

the table of a restaurant, explaining to the protesting waiters that he is trying to make himself "at home," implying America. All this is just a form of rejection of the Soviet way of life, but nothing more. Refusing to work, these young people live either off their well-to-do parents, or by selling jazz records, which are usually copied at home. It is not surprising that many of them end up in prison, not for political offences but for criminal acts. Unlike the *stilyagi*, the hooligans are not as a rule "professionals." They are workers who make their protests against the monotony of life and lack of hope for a better future by debauchery and brawling. Imbued with an anarchistical mood and often demoralized by idleness the *stilyagi* and the hooligans are the end product of the collapse of moral standards brought about by social repression and the constant interference by the state in private life. They are a noisy and striking group, but they are not large and, most of all, they are not typical of Soviet youth, of its moods or its aspirations. Soviet propaganda, true to its principle of discrediting morally its political opponents, identifies those elements of Soviet youth who are conscious enemies of the regime with the *stilyagi*. This is only a propaganda trick for the only thing the two have in common is their protest against the lack of freedom. But it is one thing to protest against absence of freedom in the name of political freedom, and another to act the hooligan.

The system of completely limiting the individual in the USSR is such that moods of depression occur even among the privileged youth, who receive everything as a birthright without having to struggle for a place in life. They understand full well that the Soviet regime alone protects their interests, and therefore they accept it. Nevertheless, their credo is not devotion to the Party and the government but a cynical *bon vivantism*, often accompanied by pessimism and a predilection for Western culture. Except for the children of the upper hierarchy, these people are not allowed to develop and are quickly overcome by a feeling of emptiness, superfluity, and despair, in extreme cases leading to suicide.

The difficult financial position of the majority of the youths, particularly students, is also a source of great dissatisfaction. Whoever does not have well-to-do parents must live on a state grant of between 250 and 400 rubles per month. After paying for a bed in the hostel and for transportation, there is very little left. Students have to eat in the hostel dining rooms, which are really bad. Cutlery is usually sticky with the grease from the water in which it is washed, crockery is covered with a thin layer of slime, tables are packed tightly together, tablecloths are dirty, and the food is unappetizing. The students grumble and laugh it off; there is little else they can do. In the spring of 1956 the students at a Moscow University hostel went so far as to boycott the dining room, which they picketed. This show of initiative worried the authorities considerably. At first they met the students' demands, but then began to seek out the ringleaders in order to make an example of them. On this occasion, however, the students remained solid and the culprits were not found. Such events are perhaps of no great significance in themselves but they do indicate the seriousness of the

dissatisfaction that is felt, and that the students can join ranks in protest. As is only to be expected, the motivating feelings of Soviet youth find their most obvious expression among those who are worst off.

A recent statement by Voroshilov inadvertently revealed the mood of Soviet youth. On March 1, 1957 he spoke at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Komsomol and his speech was broadcast. Worried by the fact that some of the younger generation were harboring ideas completely at variance with Party canons, he said: "They are maneuvering, they are seeking something, they are dreaming about something, but at any rate not about what they should [be dreaming]. . . . Therefore we can very easily crush these small beetles." On the following day, however, newspaper accounts of the speech did not include those words. But these phrases which had slipped off Voroshilov's tongue are a clear indication of the difference between the aspirations of Soviet youths and those of the regime.

The general moods of Soviet youth are something nebulous, amorphous, but they engender opinions which can become widespread when they to some extent at least find an echo. As to the question of whether some Soviet youths are able to form their own critical evaluation of life, it can be said that in spite of the unbelievably difficult conditions and the lack of any opportunity for a free exchange of ideas or of an ideological heritage, such an evaluation is in the process of being formed.

David Burg

(This article is based on the author's personal experiences as a Soviet student

REVIEWS

Kommunist

Organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Published by PRAVDA. No 3, 1957.

Economic planning in theory and practice has always occupied a central position in the Soviet system. Of late it has become even more important in view of the present leadership's efforts to untangle the bureaucratic maze that has grown up over the years, impeding Soviet economic progress as well as leading to serious deficiencies in some sectors of the economy. The lead article of this issue of *Kommunist*, "A Portentous Milestone in the Strengthening of the USSR," deals with this topic. It is really a Party ode praising the steps recently taken by the Soviet government to guarantee, in the opinion of the writers, future economic successes. The article concentrates mainly on two events which it describes as decisive: the sixth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the plenary session of the Party Central Committee that followed immediately after it. There is a close connection between these two events, since they deal with the same questions: the management of industry and the supplying of the necessary trained personnel. These two problems have been discussed in the Soviet Union for decades. The article then hails the wisdom of the Party, presumably because Khrushchev's theses on industrial questions were imminent. This article also touches on purely political matters. Soviet propaganda never misses an opportunity to proclaim the Soviets' love of peace, and does so on this occasion. "The Soviet people, engaged in constructive labor, do not need war. They need peace. Approving the economic plan and the state budget for the current year the Supreme Soviet of the USSR has analyzed the international situation in which our people will have to carry out their work."

Thus, although praising the decisions taken at these two recent meetings, *Kommunist* does not really get down to the questions discussed. In fact, more attention is paid to incidental features not directly connected with the economy. For example, it is pointed out that the USSR is a multinational state in which all the component republics are on a completely equal footing, voluntarily uniting to defend their interests and to run a common economy. Similarly, the growth of the culture of the Soviet peoples is described as a process parallel to the growth of the economy. All these claims are made in a way which has become very rare of late and which is closely in line with the officially condemned cult of the individual.

For the past two years questions of ideology have been as pressing as economic questions. It is not surprising, therefore, that a second editorial treats this theme. Entitled "The Party and Problems of the Development of Soviet Literature and Art," it is an attempt to summarize the development of culture and art during the Soviet era. It begins by stating: "Looking over the path that has been

trodden, the exponents of our literature and art can say with pride that their creation is inseparable from the heroic deeds of the Soviet people—the founders of a new life.” The point is, however, that it is precisely this sector of Soviet life that is most perturbed; it is in literature and art that the struggle has come to the surface and the earlier established forms for keeping them in a subservient role have been decisively rejected. Moreover, the Soviet government’s attempts to curb the free-thinking individuals who do not agree with the Party line are more noticeable in this sphere than in any other.

Although such a situation cannot be completely ignored, *Kommunist* tries to prove that all is well in art. With this in mind an attempt is made to distract attention from the undesirable features and put the reader on a different track by attacking the press of the non-Communist world, which, in view of its “bourgeois” nature, advocates democracy in art. “At every sharp change in the course of history the most reactionary forces have become the most zealous advocates of a spurious pure democracy.”

All this is given in order to lead up to a deduction essential from the point of view of the Soviet government: “The need for Party leadership in all spheres of our life, including . . . literature and art, is clear to everyone who really believes in Marxism-Leninism.” *Kommunist* does not, however, reveal why culture and art must be subordinated to politics. It merely comments that art is one of the most “emotionally active forms of ideology,” that is, an extremely effective propaganda weapon.

At the same time it should be noted that the article contains some extremely hypocritical statements: “The whole history of Soviet literature and art proves how carefully and sensitively the Party approached and continues to approach each talented artist, each creative individuality and different creative trends.” Apart from the obvious cynicism of this claim, it contradicts another *Kommunist* article, which appeared in issue No. 12, 1956, entitled “For a Profound Elaboration of the History of Soviet Literature.” This asserted that as a result of the cult of the individual many works had been banned undeservingly and many authors prevented from writing or subjected to repressive measures. These included Artem Vesely, Isaak Babel, Yury Olesha, and Mikhail Koltsov, to name just the best known. However, in spite of such indisputable facts, the Party central organ innocently claims that in former years “the Party put a stop to the desires of some ardent administrators in literature to wield the cudgel and crush all writers who were objectionable to them.”

Even this article contains a contradiction. After the claim that the Party has carried on patient educational work with writers who could only be called fellow-travelers, in a discussion on literary groups not fully adhering to Party instructions the article states: “An unimpassioned, scientific analysis shows that the esthetic aims of these groups acted as a brake on the development of a number of writers who had joined them and had been subjected to their influence.” Thus, these groups are both allegedly supported and categorically rejected at one and the same time.

Other examples could also be quoted. Mention is made of the condemnation of *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*, of Muradeli's opera *A Great Friendship*, and of the ban on Zoshchenko and Anna Akhmatova. This completely contradicts the earlier statement that the Party had carefully and sensitively treated each talented artist and creative individuality. This article, which is unusually long, pursues two chief aims: to prove that Soviet art has developed at an exceptional rate and to justify the need for subordinating art to Party politics.

S. Kovalev's article, "Relics of Capitalism in People's Consciousness Under Socialism and Ways of Overcoming Them," is on a very pressing topic. It does seem somewhat strange to talk about the survival of relics of capitalism in view of the fact that the Soviet regime has been in existence for almost 40 years, and that Soviet society is depicted in Communist propaganda as having created something completely new. Nevertheless, the author endeavors to prove that a new type of socialist man has emerged in the Soviet Union, that this type has become widespread and that his moral character has features not in anyone outside a Communist society. "The chief thing that characterizes the new mental form of the Soviet Man is boundless devotion to Communism and the Soviet Fatherland, hatred for the system of exploitation and oppression—capitalism—and fervent sympathy for the struggle of the workers of the world against capital." This can hardly be termed convincing, and the author's argument that Soviet citizens proved their readiness to defend socialism to the last during World War II is fallacious. Admittedly they did defend their country, but not out of any desire to preserve Communism.

Kovalev then dwells on friendship as an element of socialist morality. He writes that under the conditions of a Soviet state it is changing into "the noble idea of the friendship of the peoples of the USSR." The article as a whole deals with the destruction of the relics of capitalism in the ideological and economic spheres. This combination is in deference to the present Party line, under which the collective leadership is striving particularly hard to combine two rather independent things. In this particular instance the contrast is not so obvious. In the Soviet Union economic successes do not lead to a strengthening of ideology, because industry grows without a corresponding improvement in the well-being of the people. Since the giant industrial plants that are set up do not benefit them, the people begin to become antagonistic towards the regime and the system.

The article by Secretary of the Vladimir Oblast Party Committee Grishin entitled "Initiative and the Organizational Work of Industrial Cadres" is the latest in the series of contributions by leaders of the provincial Party organizations. It deals with the shortage of skilled workers in Soviet industry and is on the same lines as Khrushchev's later "theses." The basic idea is that one-man management is a powerful weapon in the hands of industrial leaders. It is pointed out that such management "rests on the initiative of the masses."

Of special interest is A. Narochnitsky's "The Traditions of the Revolution of 1848-49 in Hungary and the Present Day." This interest lies not so much in what the author says as in the trends the article reveals. Just over 100 years ago the military might of Tsarist Russia put down the revolution in Hungary and it

is obvious that the Soviet leaders are afraid of the parallelism between that and what took place last year. This article attempts to prevent such an eventuality, which would be so disadvantageous to the Communists, by depicting the events of the last century as a bourgeois revolution, which expressed the desire of the Hungarian people to free itself from the feudal yoke of the Hapsburgs. At the same time the bloody events of 1956 are described as a Fascist *putsch* organized by a group of anti-Communists.

A final article worthy of comment is V. Zorin's "The Negro Movement in the US at a New Stage," which is, of course, an attack on the United States, a part of the campaign that has been waged uninterruptedly for some considerable time, spotlighting sometimes one particular aspect of American life, sometimes the governmental structure, sometimes the methods of running the economy, labor or legal questions. On this occasion Soviet propaganda attempts to depict America as a country of dark reaction, a slave-holding state bound to collapse as a result of the activization of the struggle of the workers, both Negroes and whites. All the workers are depicted as suffering from a sweat-shop industrial system, from crying injustices, and from unbelievable poverty deliberately created by racial discrimination and segregation.

A. Gaev

China and Soviet Russia

By HENRY WEI

Published by *D. van Nostrand Co*, New York, 1956, 380 pp.

The establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union always involves a certain amount of danger. It is particularly dangerous for a country split internally, as was China at the beginning of the 1920's. Henry Wei's book examines this period in considerable detail. He dwells in particular on a crucial incident in Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations: Karakhan's note of 1919, in which the Soviet government announced its abandonment of all the privileges enjoyed by the Czarist government in China. In 1949—thirty years later—the Chinese People's Republic was proclaimed in Peiping. The intervening period was one of constant Soviet military, economic, and cultural aggression against China.

Henry Wei writes about the little known episode which took place when the Soviet government gave up its rights to the Chinese Eastern Railroad in the original text of Karakhan's note. The year 1919 was an extremely difficult one for the Communist regime in Russia. Lenin, for example, considered the existence of a Soviet government in this period a miracle. It was thus not surprising that the Council of People's Commissars was ready to surrender all its rights and privileges in China in return for diplomatic recognition by the Chinese government. Moreover, the abandonment of any claims such as Russian rights to the Chinese Eastern Railroad was only an admission of the existing state of affairs; for, as a result of the civil war and collapse in the Soviet Far East, the railroad had already been taken over by the Chinese and the Soviets played no part in its operation.

However, four years later, the note was no more than a scrap of paper. In 1923 its author appeared in China at the head of a special mission empowered to negotiate with the Chinese government for the recognition of the Soviet government. Karakhan brought the note of 1919 as the basis for the negotiations. However, a comparison of the texts soon revealed that the second note differed from the first in one point. There was no mention of the railroad in the second note. In Karakhan's words, the railroad was built by the efforts of the Russian people, and the Soviet government did not have the authority to dispose of it. But, as Wei points out, the railroad was actually built by Chinese laborers paid in Tsarist money, which the Soviet government refused to redeem.

The author adds a further reason for the mission's failure. By 1923, in spite of many assurances of friendship for the Chinese people and the Soviet government's abandonment of all unequal treaties and territorial possessions in China, the Red Army had become entrenched in Outer Mongolia, and showed no intentions of moving.

The book draws attention to a typical Communist way of acting, as shown by Karakhan's actions. The Soviet government was particularly anxious to obtain diplomatic recognition by China, while the Chinese were attempting to obtain a preliminary settlement of all points of dispute. The Soviet mission refused, insisting that China must first show its goodwill and friendly feelings towards the Soviet people.

The ensuing period of Sino-Soviet relations is examined well. Although having gained recognition from the central government, Moscow still supported Sun Yat-sen. There was a Soviet ambassador in Peiping and a Soviet mission in Canton. Its head Borodin and other participants were "volunteers." In any case, these "volunteers" received arms and ammunition from Moscow.

In the period 1923-49 several treaties were signed between the Soviet Union and China, but practically all of them were immediately violated by the Soviets. As an example Wei mentions the treaty of August 14, 1945. Towards the end of the war with Japan, the Soviet government alone was aware of Japan's imminent collapse, since in March 1945 the Japanese government had asked Moscow, which was not at war with Japan, to mediate in the negotiations with the Allies. Only after the end of the war did the rest of the world learn about this from the Japanese government. The author is most certainly correct when he maintains that the 1945 treaty was the result of Soviet extortion. It is difficult to find a further example of a country having to pay such a high price for the completely unnecessary help of an ally. The Soviet entrance into the war with Japan did not solve anything, or even shorten the war. Nevertheless, the Chinese representative Dr. T. V. Sung was forced by the allies to put a number of Chinese towns at Soviet disposal and to make other concessions. In the 1945 treaty the USSR received Dairen, a military base in Dalny, and the right to the joint management of the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Further, China was forced to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia, where a pro-Soviet government was firmly established by this time.

In return for these concessions Stalin promised to respect Chinese sovereignty, not to interfere in the country's internal affairs, to recognize only the central government and give it financial and moral support. A personal statement by Stalin attached to the treaty guaranteed the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria not later than three months after the cessation of hostilities.

Wei quotes a long list of violations of this treaty by the Soviets. According to the treaty the city of Dairen was to remain in Chinese hands, while a Soviet citizen was to be appointed head of the port. In the case of a war with Japan, martial law was to be declared and authority was to pass completely to the Soviets. In fact, the Chinese were never allowed to administer Dairen. The Soviet government took complete control of the town and justified itself by the fact that a peace treaty had not yet been signed with Japan. A further violation of the treaty was the fact that only Soviet ships were allowed into the port. The text of the treaty had clearly stipulated that the port was to be open to merchant vessels of the entire world. The Soviets tried to justify this step by the argument that the war with Japan was still in progress and therefore the city was subject to martial law.

A further example was Manchuria. A personal statement by Stalin had guaranteed the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the area within three months after the ending of hostilities. Thus, Soviet troops ought to have left Manchuria by December 1945. In fact they did not leave until the end of May 1946, and only after there had been mass demonstrations in all the large Chinese cities.

Throughout the period 1945-49 the Soviet government did not give the central Chinese government any help. On the other hand, in violation of the treaty, Japanese military dumps were turned over to the Chinese Communist forces, thus aiding to a considerable degree the development of the Chinese civil war. After the Communist seizure of power, the Soviet press openly admitted that there were Soviet military advisers in the forces commanded by Chu Teh.

A special chapter is devoted to Soviet plundering of Manchuria, which was carried out under the pretext of seizing military booty. All factories belonging to Japan were dismantled and moved to the Soviet Union. In December 1946 the American delegate on the Japanese reparations commission prepared a report on the state of Manchurian industry, in which he estimated that China's losses as a result of Soviet action in Manchuria amounted to two billion dollars.

The book contains a good report of the immediate pre-Communist period in the history of Sino-Soviet relations. Here the author has done the pioneering work, since there has been no earlier research on this comparatively recent period. By the beginning of 1949 the victory of the Chinese Communists was already assured. At this time the Soviet government began to increase diplomatic pressure on China in the hope of obtaining an agreement which would give the USSR a privileged position in Sinkiang. The negotiations with the central government failed. This leads to the question which Wei asks, but does not answer: what was the reason for Moscow's insistence at a time when the victory of her Chinese

allies was already assured? The aim is surely clear: to present the Chinese Communists with a *fait accompli*. This is proved by the fact that almost all the concessions made by the Chinese central government to Moscow were confirmed by Peiping after Mao Tse-tung's victory. Dairen remained in Soviet hands and Outer Mongolia remained a Soviet satellite.

Sino-Soviet relations after 1949 are given considerable attention, but this is the weakest part of the book since it is too one-sided. The author examines cooperation between the Soviet Union and Communist China under three headings: diplomatic, economic and cultural.

Economic cooperation is developing favorably for the Soviet Union. China needs considerable help for the development of heavy industry, but the Soviet Union is not in a position to supply help on the scale dictated by China's position and speed of construction. In 1950 China was granted a loan of \$300 million at the rate of \$60 million a year calculated over five years. But China received more consumer goods than heavy equipment according to the terms of this loan. In those cases when Mao Tse-tung's government succeeds in obtaining essential deliveries of heavy equipment it receives them from Eastern Europe with the Soviet Union as the mediator.

Wei's book appeared before the Hungarian events, hence the author could not have foreseen the visit of Chou En-lai to the Eastern satellites and the re-organization of economic and trade relations as a result of these events. Now there are reasons for presuming that in the future China will develop and strengthen direct economic relations with those countries of the Communist bloc which are able to offer essential aid.

Soviet help expresses itself presently in the form of technical advisers, arms, and instructors for the army, although Liu Shao-chi announced at the recent Fifth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that their number would be decreased in the near future.

Henry Wei presents a picture of one-sided cultural cooperation. China's Society for Sino-Soviet Friendship, which propagates Soviet achievements, has no counterpart in the USSR. The Society for Sino-Soviet Friendship is a parallel organization to the Chinese Communist Party with a much larger membership than the latter. It has branches in every factory, possesses mobile cinemas and libraries, and publishes hundreds of journals and newspapers, while the translation of Soviet literature into Chinese is carried out systematically, running into millions of volumes annually.

According to the author, there is no corresponding action in the USSR. There are, of course, translations of Chinese literature, but by no means on the same scale, and they appear sporadically. In this respect, the book is a little out of date. After the Hungarian events, when Moscow needed Peiping's moral aid, plans for the translation and publication of Chinese literature were extended considerably. Soviet newspapers and journals have begun extensive translation and reprinting of material from the Chinese press.

The handling of the political relations between the USSR and China is possibly the weakest part of the book. In the diplomatic sphere, the Soviet Union began a campaign for Communist China's admission into the United Nations from the very proclamation of the "people's government." China has always completely supported Soviet foreign policy, even to the extent of direct involvement in the Korean war. The author draws attention to facts such as increased Soviet penetration in Sinkiang, the unequal treaty on Dairen and Dalny, and the fact that equipment taken from Manchuria in 1945 was not returned to China after the Chinese Communists came to power. Many important facts are omitted while others are not treated in sufficient detail. There is not enough information on the treaty concluded by the Soviet government with the Manchurian dictator Kao Kang, nor is there mention of the consequences of this affair—Kao Kang's suicide after he had been accused of leanings towards autonomy. This accusation was clearly directed against the Soviet government, since, with Manchuria located between the USSR and China, Kao Kang could not have dreamt of real autonomy. There is no reference to the struggle for the division of the sphere of influence between the Soviet Union and China, nor of the clash of Sino-Soviet interests in Tibet and in Korea, where the Chinese clearly won out.

The absence of the above-mentioned facts creates the impression that Soviet expansion is the old type of territorial expansion, whereas, in fact, we are dealing with a completely different phenomenon. There is an ideological bloc full of cracks and splits, inside which a struggle to influence the general course of world events is being carried on. In the periods of the internal and external consolidation of the Moscow Central Committee, the latter gained an advantage over its weaker brother. Moscow is attempting to annex new territories and to include them in its own sphere of influence. China is doing the same. While presenting a united front against the external world, the USSR and China are at the same time split by mutual competition.

At the moment there are signs that China's role is increasing, since, as a result of inner-party disagreements and the unfavorable development of forces in the international arena, the Soviet Communist Party is being forced to allow China to play a greater part in the decisions on the fate of the Communist world.

Elsewhere Wei's book is extremely interesting and a rather complete answer to the question set by the author in the preface: why did the Communists succeed in seizing power in China and isolating the country from the free world? Henry Wei has drawn a picture of open treachery, the violation of treaties, interference in the internal affairs of another country, expansion at the expense of a weak neighbor, and the resulting economic and political collapse which brought the Communists to power.

All this must be taken into consideration by the leaders of those countries in which awakening nationalism is turning towards the East in the hope of finding a friend and ally there.

A. Kashin

St. Antony's Papers, No. 1: Soviet Affairs

Published by Chatto & Windus Ltd, London, 1956, 148 pp.

St. Antony's Papers, a new journal in the field of international affairs, is a publication of St. Antony's College, Oxford. Appearing three times a year, the journal intends to devote each issue to a particular subject or region. The first issue, published a short time ago, deals with Soviet affairs. Many of the papers which are to be included in the series as articles were originally read at seminars by members of the college or by visiting specialists. An examination of the first number indicates the beginning of what promises to be an interesting and valuable contribution to the history of our time. It presents a well-documented collection of articles, covering the period from the Civil War (1918-20) to the present.

The first article, "The Cheka," by E. J. Scott, gives a short but detailed account of the history of the Soviet secret police from 1917 to 1921. The author has succeeded in assembling much first-hand material from sources which are not readily available to the student of Soviet history. The article is a good counter-balance to those attempts by certain historians to show Lenin as a reforming idealist and to condemn all the sinister stories about the Cheka as exaggerations. Numerous examples are quoted to show that the Cheka arose from the very nature of the proletarian revolution. Although the original Cheka has undergone various changes and has carried several official designations (it is at present the MVD—Ministry of Internal Affairs), it is essentially the same organ, and remains the main prop of the Soviet system.

David Footman's "Siberian Partisans in the Civil War" is also on a historical theme, on which documentary material is extremely difficult to obtain, particularly because many reminiscences published in the 1920's are now virtually unobtainable. The author has much interesting and valuable information about the Civil War on the Siberian front, which was comparatively unknown in the West. He quotes many Bolshevik heroes from the Civil War who were later purged and are no longer mentioned in the USSR today. For example, Yakovenko, a Bolshevik and Siberian partisan mentioned in the first edition of the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* (1926), was completely ignored in the symposium *For Soviet Authority* published in Novosibirsk in 1947 and devoted to the partisan movement.

Discussing the reasons for and the nature of the partisan uprisings, the author writes:

The basis of the Partisan movement was the peasant's reaction to attempts by the authorities in the towns to interfere with him. The form of organization, military and civil, that the movement took was the one that came naturally to the peasant when and if left to organize himself. And by this very fact it became a problem to the Soviet leadership as soon as the Civil War was over (p. 24).

Nor must purely chance incidents such as dissatisfaction, local conditions, or even ignorance, which sometimes led to pro-Bolshevik uprisings, be forgotten. These uprisings were subsequently exploited by the Bolsheviks as "a genuine

manifestation of popular anger." The author gives short biographies of the Siberian partisan leaders — Yakovenko, Kravchenko, Shchetinkin, Gromov, Arkhipov, Kozyr — with an account of their activities, and analyzes the development of the movement in the area.

George Sherman's "The Russians and the East German Party" examines Soviet foreign policy in relations with East Germany. Much of the information and many figures are taken direct from the East German press. The author states that, when the Allied armies occupied Germany in the summer of 1945, the Western governments had no plan for the future of Germany. (This thesis is also confirmed by Wolfgang Leonhard's article "The Ideological Functionary.") The Soviets, however, arrived with a detailed plan, which was put into force immediately upon occupation. A rather paradoxical conclusion is that the uprising of June 1953, which caused the East German population to be so bitterly disillusioned with the West, aided the Soviet regime. This is explained by the author as follows:

Certainly in the short run they [the riots] hurried the introduction of the new reforms and gained for the working class the benefits they had been denied in the first announcements. They showed the real weakness of the S.E.D. [Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands] and how little foundation the regime had in the people. The frank admissions of the Party both before and after the riots give official substantiation to what the riots had shown most dramatically. However, they did not topple the regime. Rather, such mass disapprobation showed the Russians that if they wanted to constitute the Eastern German government as a viable instrument of authority to deal with the Western German authorities about unification, much must be done to regain it some modicum of support among its own subjects. It was reform of the regime's policy, not the abandonment of the regime, which the Soviets chose (pp. 123—124).

Geoffrey Wheeler's "New Trends in Soviet Policy Towards Islam" is extremely important in view of present Soviet pressure on the Near East and Asia. The author makes an interesting point on Islam.

[Islam] has always been regarded as potentially more obnoxious than any other creed practised in the USSR. This is partly because it has a universal character and influence not possessed by the predominant religion, the Orthodox Church of Russia, and partly because it has never, like Christianity, undergone a reformation or renaissance which could loosen the bonds of mediaevalism and bring both dogma and practice into line with modern life. The Soviet authorities have constantly been assailed by or have simulated a fear, which at times appears unreasonable and exaggerated, of the "cosmopolitan" influence of Islam among its adherents in the USSR. They are also convinced that the Muslim way of life is incompatible with modern materialism and "progress" (p. 125).

Even ignoring such questions as the extent and unity claimed for the Moslem religion, the fact that other religions have adjusted their dogmas and customs to modern life does not mean that their ability to resist Communism is automatically reduced. Surely, Christianity and other religions are equally as incompatible with Communist ideas of "progress" as is Islam?

The brevity of Wheeler's article prevents an exhaustive study of the position of the Moslem religion in the USSR, about which very little information is available. The author correctly points out, however, that purely Moslem and nationality questions are closely linked. These are problems that require much extensive study.

W. Claudius' "In a Soviet Isolator" gives interesting factual information on changes introduced into this type of Soviet political prison. The author, a German journalist arrested in 1950 in Berlin on the usual charge of espionage, passed through Lubyanka prison and various isolation prisons before his release in 1955. To date, the only person to survive these prisons was Elizabeth Lermolo, who described her experiences in *Face of a Victim*.¹ Usually, prisoners sent to Soviet isolators do not return alive. A comparison of her reminiscences with Claudius' article, is, thus, extremely interesting, especially as both spent some time in the same prisons at Vladimir, Aleksandrovsk, and Verkhne-Uralsk. She was imprisoned from 1934 to 1942; Claudius from 1950 to 1955.

It is clear that material conditions have improved considerably since Stalin's death in 1953. Both foreign and Soviet prisoners are allowed to receive mail and packages, subscribe to newspapers, and have money to buy goods from the prison. The food has improved, and, most important of all, there are hopes of being released. Prisoners are allowed to submit petitions for a review of their cases. Claudius mentions fifteen hundred Austrian prisoners who passed through the isolator on their way home.

Such changes have altered the character of the isolators, which are now more like ordinary prisons, although containing a different type of prisoner. Elizabeth Lermolo only mentioned former Party workers who had been arrested during purges or counterrevolutionaries—Mensheviks, monarchists, and Social-Revolutionaries—and later only left oppositionists and secret police. Claudius divides the prisoners into three categories: group one consisted of Soviet citizens of the pre-1938 USSR and included the old Communist Party Guard, old revolutionaries, priests and nuns, anti-Stalinists (the so-called Workers' Opposition) who were mostly arrested after 1947, members of the Soviet intelligentsia and officers arrested between 1947 and 1952 (including friends of Zhukov who were arrested for "indirect terrorism" and contact with the West), Jewish intellectuals, Zionists, Russian and Ukrainian Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses and other sectarians arrested after 1947, former Soviet POW's in Germany who had refused to fight against the Soviet army and were arrested for anti-Soviet propaganda, and former members of the Vlasov Army accused of treason.

Group two consisted of Soviet citizens of those countries occupied after 1938: Poles, West Ukrainians and Balts arrested for anti-Soviet propaganda, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic and Protestant clergy, and anti-Communist partisan leaders in the Baltic regions.

Group three consisted of foreigners: allied officers including Chinese Nationalists seized in Germany, Austria and Korea after 1945 and accused of espionage,

¹ Reviewed in *Bulletin*, No. 7 (1956), pp. 57—59.

Western intellectuals, relatives of former high-ranking officials of the Axis powers, German, Austrian, and Japanese officers accused of war crimes, German, Japanese and some Italian diplomats, high-ranking Nazis and members of the Gestapo, anti-Communists from the satellite countries, anti-Stalinists in power until 1947 and then arrested on the charge of treason, Austrians arrested between 1947 and 1952, Russian emigrés now citizens of foreign countries arrested after 1945 on charges of treason, and those emigrés who voluntarily returned home after 1945 and were arrested on charges of engaging in anti-Soviet propaganda.

Claudius gives information on various prominent former Bolsheviks: V. V. Astrov, former chief-editor of *Pravda*; N. A. Palatnikov, Trotsky's private secretary; V. D. Vershlovsky, former editor in chief of *Trud*; B. M. Kunitzky, former warden of the Institute of Red Professorship; P. A. Orlov, a former officer in the Czarist army and later Town Major of Krasnodon; Major General Yegorushkin, a Hero of the Soviet Union and commander of a division of MVD troops; and V. A. Smirnov, a pilot and also Hero of the Soviet Union.

The objective presentation of facts makes Claudius' article of great use for any historian. His remark that "in the case of the M. G. B. (Cheka) (M. G. B.—Ministry of State Security) the brutality is collective and based almost on scientific research" (p. 133) serves as a reminder that this physical and psychological terror intended to transform people is by no means confined to the prison cell.

Wolfgang Leonhard's "The Ideological Functionary" develops the above theme in the light of the Stalinist conception of "engineers of the soul." The author underwent a course in the German section of a higher Comintern school in Moscow and was then appointed instructor at the Karl Marx school in Berlin. His experiences are examined in great detail in his book *Die Revolution entlässt ihre Kinder*, published in 1955. This article only touches on the working-out of ideology among the higher Party workers. As early as July 1945 the first schools for the training of future Party cadres were opened in the Soviet zone of Germany. A plan was already in existence to provide enough schools to handle 180,000 pupils per year. As opposed to many other Soviet plans, this one was carried out almost in full; from 1947 to 1952, 400,000 functionaries passed through the metropolitan schools alone. A varied program was adopted for all levels, from short three-month courses to university courses lasting four to five years.

Leonhard points out that the Communist leaders distinguish between the education of the masses and of the functionaries. All possible means are used to exclude Western influence. Those functionaries who are being trained to occupy responsible posts must study Western philosophical theories as a means of making themselves immune to Western thought. Here, in the author's opinion, the psychological influence of criticism and self-criticism is of extreme importance.

Alec Nove's "Economics in the U.S.S.R." examines the position of Soviet economists. Scientists in many fields have been favored by the fact that neither Marx nor Lenin left any authoritative works outside the sphere of economics, but many of the economic categories of socialism have been defined once and

for all. The author sees recent signs that Soviet economists have been granted some freedom. Certain modifications were allowed in the second edition of an economic text book, while Professor Dyachenko in *Voprosy ekonomiki* attacked those economists afraid to express their own opinions. Now they are asked to put forward their own views, and the theory of the progressive dissolution of the West is relegated to the more distant future. Whether Soviet economists will be able to follow this new course depends above all on how long this new tactical direction continues.

I. Saburova

Publications of the Institute for the Study of the USSR:

SOVIETSTUDIEN, No. 2, March 1957, 200 pp. (In German).

The second issue of *Sovjetstudien* contains the following articles: Wladimir Merzalow, "Grain Harvests and Reserves in the USSR;" Fritz Meurer, "The Influence of Grain Harvests on Soviet Foreign Policy;" Karl Theodor Beck, "The Difficulties in Economic Relations between East and West;" Semjon Kabysch, "Industry and Agriculture in the Belorussian SSR in the Sixth Five-Year Plan;" Harutjun Chatchaturian, "The Sixth Five-Year Plan in Soviet Armenia;" Werner Scharndorff, "Production Methods at Vorkuta;" Wsewolod Holubnychy, "The National Income of the Ukraine in 1940 and 1954;" Leu Haroschka, "Soviet Religious Policy Since 1942;" Dr. Stanislaw Stankewitsch, "Jakub Kolas;" and Sergej Donskoi, "Soviet Historians and Western Art."

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UKRAINSKY ZBIRNYK, No. 8, 1957, 182 pp. (In Ukrainian).

This issue of the *Ukrainsky zbirnyk* contains the following articles: Halyna Korchynska, "Three or Four Laws of Dialectics;" Panas Fedenko, "Mikola Skripnik;" E. Glovinsky, "The Soviet Conception of the Development of the Economy of the Ukraine;" P. Likho, "Soviet Authority in the Provinces;" and I. Vasilevich, "Does Socialism Exist in the USSR?"

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UKRAINSKY ZBIRNYK, No. 9, 1957, 182 pp. (In Ukrainian).

This issue of the *Ukrainsky zbirnyk* contains the following articles: Bogdan Fedenko, "The New Trend in Soviet Schools and its Social Consequences;" V. Golub, "A Concise Outline of the

History of the Communist Party in the Ukraine," Panas Fedenko, "The History of the Rus Peoples and the Pereyaslav Treaty;" and V. Plyushch, "A Short History of Health Services in the Ukraine"

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DERGI, No. 7, 1957, 128 pp. (In Turkish)

This issue contains the following articles: Mirza Bala, "The Historical and Ideological Source of Soviet Colonialism and its Inevitable Fate;" A. Battal-Taymas, "The Scholar and Historian of Kazan, Rizaeddin Fahressinoglu;" N. Galay, "Crisis on the Threshold between Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policy;" Dr. E. Kirimal, "Bolshevik Nationality Policy in the Crimea 1917-1918;" Dr. G. A. von Stackelberg, "Soviet Historical Science and Eastern Studies After the Twentieth Party Congress;" Azar Tamer, "A Great Azerbaidzhan Poet, Fuzuli;" Arif Sultan, "Soviet Propaganda in the Arab World;" S. Tekiner, "The Turkic Language as the National Language of Azerbaidzhan."

The issue also contains a bibliography, reviews, and a "Chronicle of Events."

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DERGI, No. 8, 1957, 128 pp. (In Turkish).

This issue contains the following articles: Mirza Bala, "Turkology, the Turkic Languages and the Turkic Peoples in the Soviet Union;" Ahmed Magoma, "Changing Communist Opinion Towards Imam Shamil;" A. Usclis, "Railroad Transportation in the Northern Caucasus;" T. Devletçin, "The Political Structure of the Tatar Autonomous Republic;" Abdugani Derbendi, "The 1956 Islam Congress and the Question of the Peoples Enslaved by the Soviets;" V. Dubrovskiy, "The Nationalization of Soviet State Institutions After World War II."

There is also a bibliography, reviews and a "Chronicle of Events."

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS

(As reported by the Soviet Press and Radio)

March 1957

- 1 Soviet government delegation headed by Minister of Sovkhozes Benediktov arrives in Accra.
Document on the return of Czech archives at present in the USSR to the Czech government signed in Moscow.
Report published on the opening of the first all-union congress of Soviet artists.
British Ambassador to the USSR Sir Patrick Reilly presents his credentials to Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Paleckis.
Report published of arrival in Moscow of the Hungarian Minister of Heavy Industry.
Death of Major General S. Y. Zhuk reported.
Soviet government delegation headed by Minister of Foreign Trade Kabanov leaves Moscow for the 1957 Leipzig fair
- 2 TASS refutation of British press reports on the existence of secret Soviet air base in Syria published.
Central Committee's greeting to the ninth congress of the Norwegian Communist Party published.
Communiqué on the eighth session of the Soviet-Romanian commission for scientific and technical cooperation published.
- 3 Elections to local soviets held in the RSFSR, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Uzbek, Tadzhik, Lithuanian, Moldavian, and Turkmen SSR's.
Report published by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on the award of orders and medals to fishing industry workers of Maritime and Khabarovsk krais, Kamchatka and Sakhalin oblasts.
Adenauer's reply to Bulganin's letter published.
- 4 Afghan Ambassador Abdul Hakim arrives in Moscow
Soviet-Romanian mutual trade agreement for 1957 signed in Moscow
Bulganin receives East German National Front delegation.
The Polish foreign minister arrives in Moscow.
- 5 Treaty on the demarcation of the present Soviet-Polish border signed in Moscow.
The executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Europe arrives in Moscow.
Statement by Patriarch Alexis on the position of the Orthodox Church on Cyprus published.
Eleventh session of Soviet-Polish commission for scientific and technical cooperation ends in Moscow.
- 6 Appeal of agricultural workers of Smolensk Oblast to all Soviet agricultural workers to increase 1957 state deliveries of meat and milk published.
The Polish foreign minister leaves Moscow for home.
- 7 East German National Front delegation leaves Moscow for home.
Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the Belorussian SSR founded in Minsk.
- 8 Soviet Ambassador to Nepal Menshikov arrives in Katmandu
Results published of elections to local soviets in the RSFSR, Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Uzbek SSR's.
The Japanese Ambassador to the USSR arrives in Moscow.
- 9 Results published of elections to local soviets in the Lithuanian, Moldavian, Tadzhik, and Turkmen SSR's.
Czech government delegation arrives in Moscow en route for China.
- 10 Elections to local soviets held in the Kazakh, Azerbaidzhan, Latvian, Kirgiz, Armenian, and Estonian SSR's.
Appeal by major Soviet metal-workers' collectives to all ferrous metal-workers to increase production published.
Head of Soviet delegation to the UN Kuznetsov arrives in Moscow.
Menshikov presents his credentials to the King of Nepal.
- 11 Agreement between the USSR and North Vietnam on non-trade payments signed in Moscow.

- 12 The fortieth anniversary of the February revolution celebrated [the first time this revolution has received official recognition].
Gromyko and Zhukov arrive in East Berlin for negotiations on the status of Soviet troops stationed in East Germany.
Ratification documents of Anglo-Soviet fishing agreement exchanged in London.
Third session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, fourth convocation, opens in Moscow.
- 13 Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR opens in Kiev.
Communiqué on the conclusion of Soviet-East German agreement on the status of Soviet troops stationed in East Germany published.
Izvestia celebrates its fortieth anniversary.
Gromyko returns to Moscow from East Berlin.
- 14 Soviet Ambassador to Hungary Gromov presents his credentials to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Hungarian Republic.
Report published on Soviet-East German agreement on the status of Soviet troops stationed in East Germany.
Abdul Hakim presents his credentials to Voroshilov.
Mme. Furtseva receives German youth delegation.
- 15 Communiqué on negotiations between Soviet and East German government delegations on payments for products of Soviet-East German company Wismuth published.
Report published of elections to local soviets in the Kazakh, Azerbaidzhan, and Latvian SSR's.
Death of the writer N. D. Teleshov reported.
Report published of plenum of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee.
Fifth anniversary of Indo-Soviet cultural society celebrated.
Delegation of Soviet women headed by secretary of the Komsomol N. V. Popova arrives in Yugoslavia.
Kádár receives Soviet Ambassador Gromov.
- 16 Report published by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on the award of orders and medals to workers of the Moscow machine-tool works "Krasny proletary."
Zhukov leaves East Berlin for home.
Soviet government delegation leaves Moscow for Tunis.
- Results published on elections to local soviets in the Kirgiz, Armenian, and Estonian SSR's.
The Japanese Ambassador presents his credentials to Voroshilov.
- 17 Elections to local soviets held in the Georgian SSR
Party Central Committee decree on preparations for the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution published.
Statement by the Soviet foreign ministry on the proposed European common market and Euratom published
TASS report on the repatriation of Japanese citizens from the USSR published.
Eighth anniversary of the signing of Soviet-North Korean agreement on economic and cultural cooperation published.
Polish government delegation arrives in Moscow en route for Asia.
- 18 Tenth anniversary of Soviet-Bulgarian treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid celebrated.
Khrushchev receives Japanese journalist and public figure M. Hatanak.
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet ratifies Soviet-Burmese agreement on the construction of a technical institute and other projects in Burma
- 19 Report published on plenum of the Turkmen Party Central Committee.
Khrushchev's replies to questions put by American newspaper *Grand Rapids Herald* published.
Gromyko receives the executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Europe.
- 20 Hungarian government and Party delegation arrives in Moscow.
Gromyko receives Hungarian minister Imre Horvat.
The Deputy Premier of the Chinese State Council arrives in Moscow en route for home.
Zhukov receives the Hungarian minister of defense.
Bulganin receives the Hungarian Party and government delegation.
Voroshilov receives the Hungarian Party and government delegation.
- 21 Speech at the UN sub-committee for disarmament by Soviet delegate Zorin on armaments' reduction and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons published.
Soviet-Hungarian talks begin in Moscow.

22 Results of elections to local soviets in the Georgian SSR published.

Swiss Ambassador to the USSR de Haller leaves Moscow for home.

Mikoyan receives the executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Europe prior to the latter's departure for Finland.

Plenum of the administration of the Union of Belorussian Writers held in Minsk.

Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR ends in Alma-Ata.

23 Deputy Premier of the Chinese State Council leaves Moscow for Peiping.

Bulganin receives Abdul Hakim

24 Bulganin's reply to Adenauer's letter on Soviet-West German relations published.

Tito receives Soviet women's delegation.

Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR ends in Tbilisi.

25 Congress of housing specialists of the RSFSR opens in Moscow.

26 Communiqué on Soviet-Polish agreement on the repatriation of Polish citizens from the USSR published.

Congress of Belorussian agricultural experts opens in Minsk

Soviet-Polish agreement on the repatriation of Polish citizens published.

Congress of housing specialists of the RSFSR ends in Moscow.

Soviet Party delegation arrives in Vienna to participate in the seventeenth congress of the Austrian Communist Party.

27 TASS report published on press conference on disarmament held in the Soviet foreign ministry.

Bulganin's letter to the Norwegian prime minister on Soviet-Norwegian relations published.

Appeal of the Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers to all sovkhoz workers to increase agricultural production published.

Soviet-Polish agreement on scientific co-operation signed in Warsaw.

28 Soviet-Hungarian talks on cultural and scientific cooperation begin in Moscow.

Chinese press delegation arrives in Moscow.

Draft agreement on Soviet-Hungarian cultural cooperation signed in Moscow.

Soviet-Hungarian government declaration and statement on the negotiations held between delegations of the Soviet Communist Party and the Hungarian United Workers' Party signed in Moscow.

Soviet-Norwegian agreement on maritime boundaries ratified.

Hungarian government and Party delegation leaves Moscow for Kiev.

29 Congress of agricultural workers of the central non-chernozem belt opens in Moscow.

Albanian delegation arrives in Moscow to sign draft agreement on Soviet-Albanian cultural exchange.

30 Party Central Committee greeting to the Austrian Communist Party published.

Report published in the Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers on further improvement in the organization of industrial and building control.

Soviet-North Vietnam trade agreement for 1957 signed in Hanoi

31 Bulganin's letter to the Danish prime minister on Soviet-Danish relations published.

Communiqué on the exchange of ratification documents of Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement on their common border and the regulation of border incidents.

Changes and Appointments

2 A. E. Bogomolov released from his duties as Ambassador to Italy in connection with his appointment to another post.

S. P. Kozyrev appointed Ambassador to Italy.

V. M. Suslov released from his duties as member of the bureau and First Secretary of the Krasnodar Krai Party Committee.

D. S. Polyansky appointed First Secretary of the Krasnodar Krai Party Committee.

7 Y. V. Andropov released from his duties as Ambassador to Hungary in connection with his appointment to another post.

E. I. Gromov appointed Ambassador to Hungary.

L. I. Krylov released from his duties as Ambassador to Albania in connection with his appointment to another post.

V. I. Ivanov appointed Ambassador to Albania.

Elections to the union republic supreme courts were held from March 3 through March 26. The following were elected chairmen of the union republic supreme courts:

| | |
|---------------------------|------------------------|
| RSFSR | Anatoly T. Rubichev |
| Armenian SSR | Aleksyan A. Aleksanyan |
| Azerbaijani SSR | Sanan G. Musaev |
| Belorussian SSR | Sergei T. Shardyko |
| Estonian SSR | Rudolf P. Sarin |
| Georgian SSR | Isidor S. Dalidze |
| Kazakh SSR | Abdurakhman Dosanov |
| Kirgiz SSR | Abdulla Oidabaev |
| Lithuanian SSR | Karolis K. Didzulis |
| Moldavian SSR | Vasily S. Kazanek |
| Tadjik SSR | Makhmud I. Ismailov |
| Turkmen SSR | Kurban Saparov |
| Ukrainian SSR | Fedor K. Glukh |
| Uzbek SSR | Usman Ibragimov |

No information is available for the Latvian SSR.

ERRATUM

In the article "Soviet Waterpower Development in the Postwar Economy" by ALEXANDER DIBERT in the March 1957 *Bulletin*, the 1957 figures in the table "Soviet Industrial Production 1913-1955" on page 25 are **Plan** figures. The figure in the line immediately preceding the table on page 37, should read 1935, not 1953.

